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The relative economic efficiency of acquisitions as a means of 
restructuring financially distressed firms is investigated. Yearly accounting and 
daily stock price data are extracted for the period between 1979 and 1998 on firms 
entering financial distress The behaviour and performance of these firms were 
traced for a five year period following their entry into distress or until their shares 
were no longer trading. These collected data forms the basis for analyzing the 
returns acquired from investing in potential takeover targets. 
Survival analysis is used to analyze the hazard rate for both the acquisition 
and bankruptcy of distressed firms. The results of the analysis indicate that the 
ZSCORE, a predictor of the probability of failure, and SPCSRM, the rating by 
Standard and Poor’s, can be used as financial indicators in the screening 
mechanisms for financially distressed firms. 
A multinomial-logit acquisition model is used to predict three outcomes of 
financially distressed firms: survival, acquisition and failure. This model is tested 
using two methods by simulating the probability of acquisition. The first uses to 
compare the predicted versus the actual corporate events to maximize the predicted 
acquisition event. The second uses to compute abnormal return to maximize 
portfolio return over a given time period, continual on the ZSCORE, probability of 
acquisition, and the length of holding period. The predictive model of the 
acquisition probability is applied as a stock entry rule in a buy-sell system. The 
success of the model will serve two purposes. One is to predict the economic value 






 I would like to thank the following individuals who have provided both  
technical and academic support over the past two years. 
 First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Thomas Åstebro for guiding 
me into this fascinating research field and his valuable direction, suggestions and 
financial support. 
 Thanks to two examiners Dr. Oyvind Norli and Dr R. P. Sundarraj for 
reading this thesis carefully and suggesting improvements. 
 Thanks to Dr. Ranjini Sivakumar, Mr. Keith McGowan from the School of 
Accountancy for access to the Centre for Research in Security Prices data. 
In addition, Dr. Oyvind Norli offered a linking file that maps CRSP to 
COMPUSTAT. Mr. Geoff Salmon provided trading rules. Dr. Joachim Winter 
gave valuable suggestions in the simulation system design. Their suggestions and 
assistance are sincerely appreciated. 
 And, as always, thanks to my co-worker Steven Mei who helped me 
complete the simulation system implementation. 
Next, I am especially grateful to Mr. Cam McKay, who checked the 
language of the thesis very carefully on a very tight schedule and has provided 
invaluable assistance in editorial and practical issues. 
 My final thanks go to my family and friends, especially to my little 
daughter Kate ZQ Wang, for their understanding, strong support and faith in me. 
 iv
 
Abbreviations and Symbols 
 
BEGDT The first day that a stock enters any stock market 
CUSIP A nine-digit code and unique identifier for each company on 
COMPUSTAT® 
DCLRDT Distribution declaration date, the date on which the board of 
directors declared a distribution 
DLDTE The effective date (month and year) of the acquisition, merger, 
liquidation, or other reason for deletion 
DLRET Delisting return, the return of a security after it has delisted from 
the New York, American, or Nasdaq stock exchange 
DLRSN A two-digit code representing the reason a company has been 
moved from the active file to the research file 
DLSTCD A three-digit delisting code, see appendix A 
F(A)  Percentage of acquisitions 
F(B)  Percentage of bankruptcies 
GVKEY A unique, six-digit number used by Research Insight to identify 
the company 
DitressYears Number of years that a financially distressed firm is being tracked 
after the onset of distress 
OLS  ordinary least square 
P(A)  Probability of acquisitions 
P(B)  Probability of bankruptcies 
PERMNO CRSP permanent number 
RET Holding period total return, the change in the total value of an 
investment in the security over some period of time per dollar of 
initial investment 
SPCSRM S&P common stock ranking of Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
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1.1  Background 
Over the last one hundred or more years, there were four major takeover 
waves sweeping into the world economic market. The characteristics of these 
takeovers are defined chronologically as follows: monopoly in the 1890s, 
oligopoly in the 1920s, conglomerate in the 1960s and hostile bust-up takeovers 
in the 1980s. Jensen (1993) states that the takeovers and restructuring of the 
1980s are linked to widespread technological, regulatory and economic change. 
There are extensive empirical studies of takeovers in the literature. 
Powell (1997) summarizes three views of takeovers. Firstly, the takeover 
mechanism exists to discipline management teams who engage in inefficient 
behaviour. Jensen (1986) and Grossman and Hart (1980) find that shareholders 
gain benefits if an inefficient management team is replaced by a more efficient 
team when a takeover occurs. Secondly, takeovers exist to exploit synergy 
between firms. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) observe that shareholders will 
benefit if a takeover is undertaken to exploit synergy. Lastly, the firm managers 
pursue their own self-interest in looking for takeover opportunities. They 
sacrifice the benefits of shareholders. Since there exist conflicting views about 
the desirability of takeovers, it often requires government regulations to increase 
or decrease the degree of takeovers. As a consequence, takeovers become a 
concern for public policy. 
Another important aspect of takeovers that sparks broad public interest 
is the value of acquisitions. The share price of firms subject to a takeover bid 
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tends to increase between the time a bid is announced and the date at which a 
takeover is completed. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001). show that stock 
returns over the period just prior to the announcement to the completion of the 
takeover increase 24% for targets. Therefore, modelling the probability of a 
firm’s takeover may have significant economic value. Successfully picking 
takeover targets in advance of the announcement of a takeover bid could 
become a profitable investment strategy in the stock market. 
 
1.2  Research Goals 
My research is focused on investigating financially distressed firms. 
The economic value of acquisitions as a means of restructuring financially 
distressed firms provides the motivation for building a buy-sell simulation 
system. Survival analysis is used to determine the screening mechanisms for 
extracting financially distressed firms. Twenty years of accounting data from 
COMPUSTAT files and market data from the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices (referred to as “CRSP” files) were merged into an Oracle database. These 
large data samples form the basis for analyzing the returns achieved from 
investing in potential takeover targets. A stock’s abnormal return is optimized 
using the ordinary least square (abbreviated as “OLS”) estimation model. This 
optimization model is coded in the Java programming language. A multinomial-
logit model, describing the probability of acquisition, failure, and survival 
developed by Åstebro and Winter (2000) is examined in terms of its accuracy of 
acquisition prediction. Finally, business rules are set up to determine stock entry 




1.3  Outline of the Study 
Chapter 2: focuses on investment analysis. There are two topics 
discussed in this chapter. The first topic is about takeovers. The research gives 
an overview of takeovers by describing the concept of takeovers, motives for 
takeovers, classifications of takeovers and takeover characteristics. The second 
topic moves to financially distressed firms. Those firms are extensively 
examined in the two areas: 1) causes of financial distress, 2) behaviour and 
characteristics of financially distressed firms. 
Chapter 3: discusses three analytical models: 1) the capital asset  
pricing model, 2) the 3-factor model of Fama and French and 3) the OLS 
estimation model. This chapter provides the description, the structure, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each model applied in risk investment. 
Chapter 4: describes the multinomial-logit model as applied in the 
prediction of acquisition model that Åstebro and Winter developed (2001). Each 
variable in the model is declared and specifies a firm’s characteristics. A data 
trimming method for each variable is described at 95 and 99 confidence levels. 
Chapter 5: defines the objective function to compute the abnormal 
return, the rules of data extraction, and the screening mechanisms for financially 
distressed firms. 
Chapter 6: renders three results achieved from the simulation results 
analysis: a validation of the acquisition model, the impact of ZSCORE on 
portfolio return, and a null hypothesis testing for excess return. 
Chapter 7: gives the overall picture of a buy–sell trading system. The 
creation of use cases and processing models is described. The fundamental 
analysis and technical analysis join together in providing trade entry and exit 
rules. Detailed design functions are defined for the system implementation. 
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Chapter 8: summarizes the contributions of the thesis and provides 






2.1  Introduction 
This chapter covers the topics on takeovers and financial distress. 
In the late 1990s, the scale and pace of takeover activity increased. For 
example, Bell Atlantic acquired NYNEX for the sum of 21.0 billion $US. 
Travelers Group Inc acquired Citicorp for a much higher amount of reaching 
83.0 billion $US. What makes two firms worth more together than apart? 
“Motives for takeovers” will address this question in detail. How are the 
takeovers achieved? The section on “Takeovers” describes the classification of 
takeovers and explains factors deterring takeovers. The purpose of this section is 
to discuss how to define the characteristics of an acquisition candidate. Thus the 
choosing firms with particular characteristics will be employed in modeling 
takeover likelihood. 
The “Financial distress” section discusses what happens when a firm 
experiences financial distress. Clark and Ofek (1994) find that financially 
distressed targets are more likely to be successfully restructured than targets that 
are only operationally distressed. Furthermore, I will discuss how the takeover 
of distressed firms requires higher purchasing premiums than the takeover of 
non-distressed firms. This section also illustrates the characteristics of the 
financially distressed firms. 
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2.2  Takeovers 
2.2.1  Definition of Takeovers  
Takeover is a general and imprecise term referring to the transfer of 
control of a firm from one group of shareholders to another (Ross, Westerfield 
and Jaffe 1993). Takeovers are driven in part by industry shocks. Industry 
shocks as factors that alter industry structure are a source of takeover activity. 
Empirical studies find that for high-takeover industries, the industry shocks 
include deregulation, input price volatility, energy dependence, foreign 
competition, and financing innovations (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). 
• Deregulation 
Deregulation is positively related to takeover and restructuring activity. 
The act of deregulation removes artificial constraints on the size of existing 
firms and attracts new entrants into the market. The adaptation to these changes 
in industry organization could be facilitated by takeovers. The empirical 
evidence for the acquisition activity caused by deregulation can be found as 
follows: in the 1980s, deregulation induced significant merger activity in 
industries such as air transport, natural gas and trucking. In the 1990s, 
deregulation was directed toward other sectors including banking, electric 
utilities, and telecommunications. The deregulation was widely spread over 
many types of industries (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). 
• Energy dependence 
Jensen (1993) states that one shock driving takeover activity during the 
1980s was oil price volatility. He suggests that this shock not only directly 
affected the oil industry itself, but also was an important factor in the structure 
of industries in which energy was a major input. The regression test (Mitchell 
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and Mulherin 1996) shows that the volatility of oil prices positively affected 
takeover activity. 
• Foreign competition 
During the 1980s, import penetration increased in many industries. Prior 
research documents that the changes in foreign competition influence price-cost 
margins and other measures of industry efficiency. Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) in their regression analysis shows that foreign competition does not have 
a significant effect on takeover and restructuring activity. However, they found 
that foreign competition heightens the takeover and restructuring activities in 
high-tech industries, such as computer data processing and electronics that are 
expanding at a fast pace in the world market. 
• Financing innovations 
Another shock during the 1980s was the significant increase in high-
yield debt financing. Empirical research records that the enhanced ability to use 
leveraged financing removed obstacles to takeovers, especially for larger firms 
(Kaplan 1989). The result was that the number of takeover targets was relatively 
large in the 1980s merger wave. Several empirical papers document that the 
fraction of debt in capital structure is inversely related to R&D/sales at the 
industry level (Long and Malitz 1985). The above regression analysis tested the 
assumption that industry R&D/Sales is negatively and significantly related to 
takeover and restructuring activity. It concludes that innovations in financing 
techniques are very important for the takeover and restructuring activity. 
It is a well known fact that shareholders of target companies definitely 
gain from mergers and tender offers(Franks and Harris 1989). However, critics 
argue as to what is the source of takeover gains. They support redistributive 
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theories that claim shareholder gains are offset by economic losses to others. 
Some reviews of the most important redistributive theories are listed as follows: 
1) Tax motives have long been suspected as an important cause of 
merger and acquisition activity. Acquiring a firm’s tax losses and credits, and 
the option to step-up the basis of the target’s assets without paying corporate 
level capital gains, are two tax benefits that appear to have had some impact on 
merger activity (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988). However, most recent 
studies assign tax benefits a minor role in explaining merger and takeover 
activity. Much of the takeover activity in the last twenty years was not tax 
motivated. 
2) Bondholders’ losses from takeovers is strongly supported by the 
redistributive theories. Nevertheless, in recent empirical research, Denis and 
McConnell (1986) indicate that “on average holders … in the acquired firm gain 
from a merger. Those … in the acquiring firm neither gain nor lose in a 
merger.” They also find some evidence that the acquiring firms’ common 
shareholders do not lose and may even gain from mergers, especially in the days 
immediately following the announcement. This evidence provides no support 
for the view that the supposed gains from acquisitions are actually transfers 
from the holders of senior securities to the holders of common stock; the source 
of takeover gains seems to be a result of wealth enhancing changes. 
3) The theory that losses of the labour force financial takeovers has not 
been tested widely. The statistical results based on Michigan’s employment and 
wages survey reveals that wages and employment rise on average for firms that 
are involved in acquisitions (Brown and Medoff 1987). This evidence is 
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contradictive to the redistributive theory that claims a shift of wealth from 
labour to shareholders. 
To summarize, the above evidence points to that the premiums in 
takeovers maybe represent real wealth gains and are not simply wealth 
redistributions. 
 
2.2.2  Motives for Takeovers 
Significant stock price increases occur prior to formal announcements 
of takeovers. The evidence for this is provided by Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001). They show that stock returns over the period from just prior to 
the announcement up until the completion of the takeover increase 24% for 
targets. This study shows that the shareholders of target companies clearly 
benefit from takeovers. 
From the literature review, there are three common motives for 
takeovers that are widely accepted. First is the managerial discipline motive 
(Grossman and Hart 1980). Second is complementary resources motive. The last 
is the free-cash-flow motive. 
The central finance theory states that takeovers are a mechanism by 
which managers of a firm who fail to maximize the firm’s market value are 
replaced by more efficient managers (Asquith 1983). Takeovers act as a means 
of restructuring financially distressed firms. Managerial discipline acquisitions 
have been suggested as an important mechanism to induce the efficient 
redeployment of assets of a bankrupt firm (Jensen 1991). The result of these 
types of takeovers will be an improvement in the operating performance on 
average. 
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Complementary resources are another motive for takeovers. In this case, 
acquirers and targets have complementary resources. This means that each has 
what the other needs. For example, a small firm may have a unique product but 
lack the engineering and sales organization required to produce and market it on 
a large scale. Instead of spending large resources and time in developing 
engineering and sales forces on their own, the board managers of the target firm 
may seek to undergo an acquisition process in order to obtain these resources. It 
is a quicker and cheaper way for the target to obtain these missing resources. On 
the other hand, the acquirer also benefits from the acquisition process. The 
unique products and intelligent human resources from the target firm will add 
impetus to the acquirer’s existing production line and bring profit in any 
expanding market. In short, the acquisition initiated by the complementary 
resources motive makes the two firms function better than they would as 
separate entities. Each firm acquires something it does not have and gets it 
cheaper than it would by acting on its own. 
Generally speaking, a firm with surplus funds is in a mature industry. 
The firm has a large amount of free cash flow, but it has few profitable 
investment opportunities. Some of these firms are often reluctant to pay out 
dividends to stockholders. They seek to be acquired so they can have the 
opportunity to redeploy their capital. The acquirers, on the other hand, want to 
capture this firm’s cash flow in order to invest in new productive projects. 
Therefore, this free-cash-flow motivates both parties to become involved in the 
acquisition process. 
To summarize, the managerial discipline motive, the complementary 
resources motive and the cash-free-cash-flow motive allow a takeover to add 
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value to both firms. These takeovers eliminate inefficient management, make 
better use of existing resources, add revenues and create growth opportunities. 
Different types of takeovers generate different kinds of value to both 
firms. What are the varieties of takeovers? The next topic will explain the 
classification of takeovers in depth. 
 
2.2.3  Classification of Takeovers 
The classification of takeovers includes tender offers, mergers, and 
leveraged buyouts. Tender offers are classified as friendly or hostile. One 
common distinction between friendly and hostile offers is based upon whether 
or not the initial offer is rejected. Friendly tender offer refers to offers that are 
supported by target management. Hostile tender offers are those that are 
opposed by the target management. 
Nuttall (1999) in his paper of estimating takeover likelihood models 
finds that friendly and hostile takeover likelihood have statistically distinct 
determinants. The firm’s age, size, leverage and even takeover rumours are 
individually significantly different across the takeover types at the 6% level. He 
reported the following findings: 
• Being relatively young on the stock market has a much stronger 
positive effect on the likelihood of a firm becoming a friendly target 
rather than a hostile target. 
• A firm’s size has a strong negative effect on the probability of being 
friendly acquired, but an insignificant effect for being hostile-
acquired. This supports the view that larger firms are better able to 
defend themselves against hostile takeovers. Small firms with 
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financial constraints have an incentive to merge with larger 
companies without financial constraints. 
• A firm’s leverage has a strong positive effect on the probability of 
being friendly acquired, but not on the probability of being hostile-
acquired. This is consistent with the view that the financially 
distressed companies are more likely to accept rescue offers. 
• Lastly, takeover rumours equally positively affect both the 
likelihood of being friendly acquired and being hostile-acquired. 
 
Although both friendly and hostile targets have poor pre-bid 
performance, the stock returns for firms subject to hostile takeovers normally 
average about 14% more than for those firms subject to friendly takeovers 
(Franks and Harris 1989). Shareholders of target companies therefore clearly 
benefit from takeovers. 
A “takeover” can also be induced from within the firm, as became 
apparent in the 1980’s. Defensive asset restructuring includes any major asset 
restructuring or recapitalization induced by implicit takeover pressure, such as a 
large block purchase by a corporate raider or the growing occurrence of 
takeover activity in the firm’s industry. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter.(1988) 
define leveraged buyouts as: “Leveraged buyouts are buyouts of shareholder’s 
equity, heavily financed with debt by a group that frequently includes 
incumbent management.” In terms of profit from defensive asset restructuring, 
Lehn and Poulsen (1987) find premiums of 21 percent to shareholders in 93 
leveraged buyouts taking place from 1980 to 1984. 
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2.2.4  Characteristics of Takeover Targets 
There is a couple of potentially interesting areas of study on the 
differential characteristics of takeover targets. One is from the academic 
perspective. Research on takeover targets’ characteristics can lead to 
constructing a likelihood model of acquisitions. Second, from an industry 
perspective, studying the underlying differential characteristics of target firms 
will shed light on their restructuring. An empirical analysis assesses differences 
in the financial characteristics of takeover targets and non-takeover targets. The 
results indicate that the unique characteristics of takeover targets, relative to 
nontargets are: small firm size, young age when the firm enters the stock 
market, rumour sensitivity which implies having a high takeover speculation, 
low profitability, low Tobin’s Q and low leverage (Hasbrouck 1985). 
Tobin’s Q is a measure of the ratio of the market value of financial 
claims on the firm to the current replacement cost of the firm’s assets. It is 
considered to be an important variable in investigating takeover activities. Firms 
displaying Q’s greater than unity are judged as using scarce resources 
effectively, and those with Q’s less than unity are seen as using resources poorly 
(Wilbur G. Lewellen and Badrinath 1997). Tobin’s Q is indicative of managerial 
performance. A firm with a low Q value relative to other firms is assumed to 
seek acquisitions to acquire valuable resources. 
Low leverage is viewed as a signal of managerial incompetence. Studies 
show that takeover targets will have lower pre-existing levels of debt. The 
relationship is likely to be firm-specific rather than industry-specific between 
this variable and takeover likelihood (Hasbrouck 1985). 
Financial liquidity calculated as the combination of current financial 
assets and liabilities is also an indicator of takeover behaviour. Petruzzi (1983) 
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found, “The tax consequences of distributing cash to the shareholders may be 
unfavourable, and acquisition may be a vehicle for reallocating these funds in a 
fashion that minimizes taxes. The takeover targets that have excess liquidated 
assets may lead to either firm- or industry-specific relationship to takeover 
likelihood.” 
Firm size is a firm-specific control variable. The likelihood of takeovers 
decreases with the size of the firm. Firstly, it is for financial synergy reasons, as 
outlined above in motives for takeovers. Secondly, there are transaction costs of 
takeovers related to size. Several studies illustrate that it is a costly process and 
a prolonged battle to absorb the target into the acquirer’s organizational 
framework. Size is a significant factor in determining the probability of 
acquisitions (Palepu, 1986). 
The age of the firm also plays an important role in the takeover 
activities. The likelihood of a takeover increases when the age of the target is 
quite young. Two reasons are found from the empirical studies in explaining this 
point. One reason is financial synergy. When the target is quite young, it usually 
strongly performs well. From the aforementioned, acquirers being cash-rich and 
targets being small or strongly performing are more likely to have synergy 
acquisitions. The integration between two firms makes both function better than 
they perform separately. Financial synergy increases productivity (Nuttall 
1999). The other reason is more uncertainty about a market entrant. Since there 
is a very high turnover amongst entrants, young firms are more likely to go 
bankrupt, or at least experience financial distress, than older firms. 
Consequently, younger firms may be more apt to eagerly look for rescue 
bidders. 
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Having a high takeover speculation implies that a firm is expected more 
likely to be acquired in the public press. It is another positive characteristic of 
takeover targets. Investors overweight their prior beliefs about the stock’s value 
and the stock price over-reacts. It results in huge profit making for takeover 
shareholders on the day that the acquisition announcement is made (Nuttall 
1999). 
In short, investigating the financial characteristics of takeover targets 
will yield insight into the economic forces underlying takeover activities 
(Hasbrouck 1985). This will be fundamental in analysing the virtue of takeover 
targets. 
 
2.2.5  Factors Deterring Acquisition 
There are a couple of major factors deterring the process of acquisition. 
One is that firms with more complex debt structures encounter more 
difficulty in achieving the completion of acquisition. An acquisition is a 
substitute for reorganization and requires creditor approval. Therefore, for firms 
with more complex debt structures, gaining creditor approval for an acquisition 
is likely to be more difficulty because of possible disagreements among creditor 
groups over the distribution of the proceeds from the sale. Takeover activity will 
more likely happen in the firms whose management has already been replaced 
and for firms with less complex debt structures. 
The other factor deterring acquisition is industry conditions. Generally 
speaking, potential bidders as acquiring firms in the same industry are also 
likely to be financially distressed and thus be constrained in their ability to raise 
funds to acquire the more poorly performing firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). 
The financially distressed firms with better future prospects (good firms) are 
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likely to choose to reorganize as independent companies rather than attempt a 
sale in a market where both good firms, and firms with poor prospects (bad 
firms), sell at a low price. This adverse selection process leads to, on average, a 
lower quality pool of potential acquisitions. 
 
2.3  Financial Distress 
2.3.1  Definition of Financial Distress 
John (1993) in the article of Managing Financial Distress states, “a firm 
is in financial distress at a given point in time when the liquid assets of the firm 
are not sufficient to meet the current requirements of its hard contracts”. He 
categorizes the financing contracts of a firm into hard and soft contracts. Hard 
contracts can be either a coupon debt contract which specifies periodic 
payments by the firm to the bondholders, or contracts with suppliers and 
employees. Common stock and preferred stock fall into a category of soft 
contracts. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) define financial distress as violation of debt 
covenants, inability to service debt, default on debt, or needing cash for 
operations, or having filed for Chapter 11 protection. 
There are thus varying definitions of financial distress. Some are quite 
specific while others include a host of financial difficulties. 
 
2.3.2  Causes of Financial Distress 
In general, financial economists find it difficult to tell whether a firm’s 
poor performance is driven by financial distress or not. Altman (2000) finds 
large indirect costs of financial distress, but does not distinguish them from 
negative operating shocks. Recent studies find that many firms are not only 
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financially distressed, but also economically distressed (Clark and Ofek 1994). 
It increases the difficulty to identify whether the costs of distressed firms are 
trigged by financial distress, economic distress, or by an interaction of both. My 
literature review finds that high leverage is one of the primary causes of distress, 
but it is difficult to conclude from this evidence whether it is economic or 
financial distress causing high leverage. 
In this study, I am not interested in trying to explain the underlying 
factors of distress. Rather, I use measurable firm and industry characteristics 
that apparently predict financial distress and take them as given. 
 
2.3.3  Behaviour of Financially Distressed Firms 
Poor stock performance could be the first indication that a firm is in 
financial trouble. However poor performance does not lead to financial distress 
without high leverage. The organizational change is unlikely to occur in an all-
equity firm. Financial distress is often accompanied by comprehensive 
organizational changes in management, governance, and structure. A firm under 
financial distress seeks revitalisation. Financial distress often frees resources to 
move to higher-valued uses by forcing managers and directors to reduce 
capacity and to rethink operating policies and strategic decisions. Financial 
distress leads to negotiation with a firm’s creditors. The creditors have a legal 
right to demand restructuring because their benefits are breached when the firm 
is under financial distress. To summarize, financial distress is resolved in an 
environment of imperfect information and conflicts of interest. The specific 
behaviours in response to financial distress are described as follows: 
• Restructuring management and governance 
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Poor management decision-making and weak governance can cause 
financial distress. Incumbent management teams and director boards can also 
deter the pace of technological changes. In order to increase the efficiency of 
management, shareholders strongly demand changing the top management 
structure. Changes in top management and boards of directors become a means 
of the firm restructuring to deal with their financial crisis. Gilson (1989) 
observed that distressed firms experience a 52% annual turnover of top 
management. This observation further supports the fact that financial distress 
provides a mechanism to initiate top-management changes. He also finds that 
turnover among directors is high following distress, and the size of the director 
board shrinks following distress as well. 
 
• Reforming organizational strategy and structure 
Empirical papers document that some firms in financial distress undergo 
dramatic organizational changes as part of their recovery, refocusing their 
strategy and undertaking restructurings (Hotchkiss and Mooradian 1998). To 
protect their interests, major shareholders attend board meetings, intervene in 
the company’s strategy making and monitor its restructuring process. Financial 
distress can force managers to undertake value-increasing organization changes, 
such as selling, reorganizing or restaffing part of its assets. This restructuring 
creates value for the firm’s claimholders. It also illustrates how the financial 
structure interacts with investment decisions: financial distress forces a change 




2.3.4  Characteristics of Financial Distress Firms 
The violation of a debt covenant gives a warning that distress is 
imminent. A firm in financial distress is insolvent. The present value of the 
firm’s cash flows is less that its total obligations. 
As financial distress affects a firm’s ability to conduct business as usual, 
the distressed firm exhibits the following three common characteristics: 
1) Decreasing power on decision making 
As claimholders intervene in the daily operation of a distressed firm,  
managers lose the right to make certain decisions without legal approval. In 
contrast to the pre-distress situation, the firm cannot spend money or sell assets 
without agreement from their claimholders. 
2) Decreasing market demand 
To some extent, the value of products and services that a firm provides  
to customers is highly related to the firm’s performance. This is consistent with 
the view that customers like purchasing goods with a famous brand name. 
Therefore, a financial distress situation may ruin the company’s image. This can 
result in a decrease in demand for the firm’s products and services, which 
threatens the firm’s ability to survive. 
3) Decreasing power in price negotiation 
Financial distress affects a firm’s ability to negotiate favourable input  
prices or credit terms. Since the distressed firm doesn’t have sufficient cash to 
pay its debts, suppliers often charge a risk premium through increasing prices, 
tightened credit terms. Some suppliers even redefine their relationship with the 
firm as a short-term one (Wruck 1990). All of those negative effects resulting 
from the financial distress decrease the firm’s bargaining power in negotiations 
on input material prices and other services. 
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4) Increasing time in resolving financial distress 
When a firm faces financial distress, the managers of the firm are eager  
to engage in restructuring management and governance, and changing 
organizational strategy and structure. All these activities require that 
management spend considerable time resolving financial distress. The increased 
time spent by the managers in productive restructuring will hopefully lead to 
increasing the value of the firm. 
 
2.3.5  Takeover of Financially Distressed Firms 
The takeover of distressed firms requires higher purchasing premiums 
than the takeover of non-distressed firms because the market adds a risk 
discount to a distressed firm(Åstebro and Winter 2000). 
The takeovers of distressed firms are more likely to involve firms in the 
same industry and are less likely to be hostile takeovers. Clark and Ofek (1994) 
discover this characteristic by examining thirty-eight takeovers of distressed 
firms. In their test, they also find that financially distressed targets are more 
likely to be successfully restructured than targets that are only operationally 
distressed. Buyers of distressed firms seldom gain concessions, but concessions 
do increase the probability of successfully restructuring targets. Furthermore, 
the smaller the target is relative to the buyer, the higher is the likelihood of a 
successful takeover. 
When a firm experiences financial difficulties, they look at the 
following courses of action to survive. The first remedy is to voluntarily 
restructure its operations. The second alternative is to restructure its operations 
and financial claims under the protection of the bankruptcy court. Another 
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effective means of restructuring for distressed firms is a merger of their 
operations with those of an acquirer. The following discussion will focus on the 
characteristics of both takeover targets and acquiring firms. 
• Bidder performance 
Distressed targets perform very poorly; however, the bidders’ 
performance is not significantly different from other firms in their industry or 
risk class. Bidders are less leveraged than targets. The bidder’s average ratio of 
debt to assets is 28.8 percent, compared to 39.2 percent for targets, and the 
difference between these ratios is significant at the 10-percent level (Clark and 
Ofek 1994). 
• Concessions 
An acquiring firm may need to reduce the level of fixed claims on a 
target to be able to revive a distressed firm. Concessions reduce the stringency 
of financial contracts by reducing interest rates, delaying repayment, or 
temporarily lifting other debt covenants. This cost savings allows the acquiring 
firm more flexibility in using its available cash flow. Receiving concessions is 
important for a distressed firm to successfully complete its takeover 
restructuring. 
• Industry similarity 
An acquiring firm that is in the same industry as their takeover target 
may be better able to restructure the distressed firm. Industry-specific 
management expertise, synergies, and market power are three possible reasons 
for industry-related bidders to be more capable of saving a failing firm. Clark 
and Ofek (1994) find that twenty-one out of thirty-eight firms match the four-
digit SIC of the takeover targets in their sample acquisitions. 
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• Abnormal returns 
Tobin’s Q is an important determinant of the size of abnormal returns 
available around the time of the takeover announcement (Servaes 1991). High Q 
firms are considered to have more intangible assets, such as management 
expertise, than are low Q firms. Clark and Ofek (1994) find that bidder and 
target cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are larger when the bidder is a high 
Q firm and the target is a low Q firm, and CARs are smaller when the situation 
is reversed. The implication of this result is consistent with the market 
expectation that more return will be forthcoming to shareholders when a firm 
with good management takes over a firm with poor management. 
 
2.4  Summary 
There are three conclusions that can be derived from the investment 
analysis. First, the characteristics of the takeover targets differ from nontargets 
in that the firms are small in size and young in age, have a high takeover 
speculation and possess low profitability, low Tobin’s Q and low leverage 
(Hasbrouck 1985). These unique characteristics except having a high takeover 
speculation and low Tobin’s Q, are included as input variables in the acquisition 
model discussed in chapter 4. However, having a high takeover speculation and 
low Tobin’s Q should not be ignored. A high takeover speculation triggers 
investors to overweigh their prior beliefs about the stock’s value and the stock 
price subsequently over-reacts. It has been shown that Tobin’s Q as an indicator 
of managerial performance has an effect on the acquired firm’s behaviour. 
Second, the characteristics of firms taken over via a friendly bid differ 
from the characteristics of firms taken over via a hostile bid (Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1988). 
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Lastly, a takeover generates an economic gain if the two firms are worth 
more together than as separate entities. Gains from takeovers may reflect 
improved efficiency of management, the combination of complementary 
resources, or redeployment of free cash flow. Gains bring profit to shareholders. 
How do we measure the stock return resulting from investing in firms’ that are 
being acquired? The next chapter will provide several different analytical 







3.1  Introduction 
The stock market is risky because there is a wide spread of possible 
outcomes. When the stock market goes up, an investor has the potential of high 
returns. When the stock market goes down, an investor faces the risk of losing 
money. For example, the stocks of Nortel Networks Corporation soared to more 
than $120 per share in 2000, but fell to less than $1 per share in 2002. Most 
investors lost money from investing in Nortel stocks. How is risk defined? What 
are the links between risk and return? Are there any analytical methods to 
measure the risk? 
This chapter will define risk and return. The capital-asset pricing model 
(CAPM), the 3-factor model and the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
model will be presented as different methods for calculating return. At the end 
of the chapter, the decision is made to choose one of the above models to use in 
my research for computing the excess return. 
 
3.2  Risk 
The definition of risk varies based upon each individual investor. The 
American Heritage Dictionary defines risk as the possibility of suffering harm 
or loss. Malkiel (1996) defines risk as the chance that expected security returns 
will not materialize and, in particular, that the securities a person holds will fall 
in price. It is a fact that risk is the probable variability or dispersion of future 
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returns. So financial risk is defined as the variance or standard deviation of 
returns in general. The higher the standard deviation is, the greater is the risk. It 
is a well known fact that higher returns have been associated with higher risks. 
Risk includes unsystematic risk and systematic risk. Unsystematic risk 
stems from the fact that many of the perils that surround an individual company 
are peculiar to that company and perhaps its immediate competitors. Systematic 
risk stems from the fact that there are other economy wide perils which threaten 
all businesses (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 1993). 
The unsystematic risk can be eliminated by diversification. Because 
prices of different stocks do not move exactly together, diversification can 
provide a substantial reduction in variability. Systematic risk measures the 
degree of sensitivity that a security has as it moves in the stock market. It cannot 
be eliminated by diversification. However, an investor can select a diverse 
portfolio to reduce the systematic risk by selecting stock that have negatively 
correlated returns (Malkiel, 1996). 
There are several methodologies to model and measure risk such as the 
CAPM, the 3–factor model and the OLS estimation model. All of these show an 
investor how to minimize risk by combining stocks in their portfolios to 
maximize the return they seek while minimizing risk. 
 
3.3  The Capital-Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Principles of CAPM: 
The general formula for CAPM is: 
εβ itR ftRmtiR ftRit +−+= )(     (1) 
where: 
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Rit  : is rate of return. 
R ft : : is risk free Rate. 
Rmt : : is return from market. 
β i  :  is the standard risk measure for individual securities and 
describes the covariance between the particular stock and the market. 
ε it :  The unexplained component of  represented by the 
disturbance term epsilon. 
Rit
 
The above formula implies that the risk premium1 an investor received 
on any stock or portfolio increases directly with the beta  value. The return 
on a stock or a portfolio is over and above the risk free rate of interest. 
β i
The efficiency of the market portfolio has two implications: one is that 
the expected return has a positive relationship with market betas. The other is 
that market betas are sufficient to describe the cross-section of expected returns. 
 
Flaws of CAPM: 
Malkiel (1996 ) summarizes the major flaws of the CAPM as follows: 
1) Beta is a fickle short term performer and sometimes fails to work over 
long periods of time. 
Black, Michael and Sholes (1972) found an anomaly for the period from 
April 1957 through December 1965 in terms of the relationship between 
beta and returns. Not only does the zero-beta exceed the riskless rate during 
this period, but securities with higher risk also produced lower returns than 
                                                 
1 Risk premium is defined as the difference between risky returns and risk-free returns. 
Risk-free return is the return invested in Treasury bills with a 90-day maturity. 
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less-risky (lower beta) securities. This finding is in contradiction with the 
prediction of the CAPM. Malkiel (1996) also found that mutual fund returns 
bore no relationship to their beta measures of risk for the entire decade of 
the 1980s. Therefore, investors who use the CAPM may risk being 
penalized for some periods of time. 
 
2) Estimated betas are unstable 
Criticism of the asset-pricing model is prompted by the size effect 
(Banz 1981). Banz finds that average returns on small stocks are too high 
given their beta estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. 
The research further shows that the prediction of beta that is only based on 
past experience is very inaccurate. In an uncertain market environment, the 
economical change, industry shocks, changes of company structure, 
business strategy, or competitors status will impact the sensitivity of the 
company’s stock to market fluctuations. Betas of individual stocks should 
vary over time. It is concluded that historical betas may be quite imperfect 
indicators of future betas. Investors who overly trust betas as a useful 
predictor of the behaviour of individual stocks may suffer great loss. 
 
3) Beta is easily rolled over 
Roll (1984), a financial theorist says that it is impossible to estimate the 
market’s return. In principle, the market includes all stocks, a variety of 
other financial instruments, and even non-marketable assets such as an 
individual’s investments in education. The S&P index (or any other index 
used to represent the market) is therefore a very imperfect market proxy. 
Thus I may obtain a quite imperfect estimate of market sensitivity. Roll 
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stated, “When the change of the market index against betas is measured, one 
could obtain quite different measures of the risk levels of individual stocks 
or portfolios. As a consequence, one would make very different predictions 
about the expected returns from the stocks or portfolios.” 
Malkiel (1996) sums up the evidence for the CAPM: 
“Beta, the risk measure from the capital-asset pricing model, looks  
nice on the surface. It is a simple, easy-to-understand measure of  
market sensitivity. Unfortunately, beta also has its warts. The actual 
relationship between beta and rate of return does not correspond to  
the relationship predicted in theory. Moreover…Betas are not stable  
from period to period, and they are sensitive to the particular market  
proxy against which they are measured.” 
 
3.4  The 3-Factor Model of Fama and French 
Variables Analysis: 
Banz (1981) documents a strong negative relationship between average 
return and firm size. Bhandari (1988) finds that average return is positively 
related to leverage, and Basu (1983) finds a positive relationship between 
average return and earnings-price ratio (E/P). Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg 
Reid and Lanstein (1985) document a positive relationship between average 
return and book-to-market equity for U. S. stocks. These interesting findings 
indicate that the simple relationship between beta and average return 
disappeared during the recent 1963-1990 period. Fama and French (‘FF” is used 
as following) (1992) demonstrate that for the 1963-1990 period, firm size and 
book-to-market equity capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
returns associated with size, E/P, book-to-market equity, and leverage. Their 
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results conflict with the asset-pricing model. It is well known that variables like 
size, E/P, leverage, and book-to-market equity are important factors. They are 
all scaled versions of a firm’s stock price, and may somehow overlap in 
explaining average return. These factors and their relationship with stock returns 
will be analyzed in detail as follows: 
Size 
Portfolios are formed on size because size produces a wide spread of 
average returns and beta (Chan and Chen 1988). Size and beta are highly 
correlated. FF, using the two-pass sort on size and beta, say that variation in beta 
that is tied to size is positively related to average returns, but variation in beta 
unrelated to size is not compensated for the average returns of 1963-1990. FF 
concludes that there is a negative relationship between size and average return, 
but when firm size is controlled for, there is no reliable relationship between 
beta and average return. 
Book-to-market equity 
FF shows that there is a strong positive relationship between average 
return and book value of assets to market equity. This relationship is unlikely to 
be a beta effect. The average returns for both negative book value firms and 
high book value of assets to market equity firms are high. FF documents that the 
results of negative book value form persistently negative earnings and high book 
value of assets to market equity. This means that stock prices have fallen. Both 
negative book value and high book value of assets to market equity are both 
signals of poor earnings prospects. It is also noticed that book value of assets-to-
market equity captures cross-sectional variation in average returns that are 
related to relative distress. 
Earnings-price ratio (E/P) 
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Ball (1978) points out that earnings–price ratio is a catch-all for omitted 
risk factors in expected returns. Earnings-price ratio is a proxy for expected 
returns when earnings are positive, but it is not when earnings are negative. 
FF find that the relationship between earnings–price ratio and average 
returns seems to be absorbed by the combination of firm size and book value of 
assets-to-market equity in their experiments. The conclusion they make is that 
size and book value of assets–to-market equity provide a simple and powerful 
characterization of the cross-sectional average stock return. 
 
Formula of the 3-Factor Model: 
The three-factor model is applied by regressing the pre-event monthly 
excess returns for a firm based on a market factor, a size factor, and a book-to-
market factor: 
 
εβ ittiiiftmtiiftit HMLhSMBsRRRR +++−+∂=− )(   (2) 
 
Data description in the 3-factor model: 
Rit : the simple return on the common stock of firms i. 
R ft :  the return on three-month treasury bills. 
Rmt : the return on a value-weighted market index. 
SMBt : the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. 
HMLt :  the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks less  the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low 
book-to-market  stocks. 
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∂i : the intercept, representing the value that  is expected to 
occur when the explanatory variables are zero. It is zero for all assets. 
R ti,
β i  :  the covariance between the particular stock and the market. 
ε ti, : the unexplained component of  represented by the 




The three–factor model offers the advantage that it does not require 
size or book-to-market data for sample firms, and explains the value premium 
better than the CAPM. It implies: 
• Firms without available data on market value of equity or book-to-
market ratios can be included in the analysis. 
• Some large firms or firms with low book-to-market ratios may in 
fact have common stock returns that more closely mimic those of 
small firms with high book-to-market ratios. 
• The model largely captures the average returns on U.S. portfolios 
formed on size, book-to-market ratio and other variables known to 
cause problems for the CAPM such as earnings/price, cash 






• Given four parameters in the regression, it requires at least five 
observations of pre-event monthly returns. This creates a survivor 
bias among remaining sample firms. 
• When long-horizon returns are considered, the regression estimates 
are assumed stable over the estimation period. 
 
3.5  Abnormal Return – the OLS Estimation Model 
Properties of Daily Stock Return and Excess Return: 
Empirical studies show that daily stock data has significant differences 
from monthly stock data. It brings the following properties of daily excess 
return: the first is a non-normality property. Fama (1976) found evidence that 
the distributions of daily returns are fat-tailed relative to a normal distribution. It 
illustrates the fact that the daily stock return departs significantly from normality 
which is not the case with monthly data. The second is the non-synchronous 
trading issue. When using the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation model to 
calculate the excess return, the return on a security and the return on the market 
index are measured differently in terms of the trading time interval. This 
difference is the cause of bias and inconsistency in the estimates of the OLS 
model parameters. With the daily data, the bias becomes “especially severe” 
(Scholes and Williams 1977). The third is that serial dependence exists in daily 
excess returns (Ruback 1982). The fourth is cross-sectional dependence in 
excess returns. Beaver (1968) found benefits to incorporating cross-sectional 
dependence into the variance estimation. The last property is stationarity of 
daily variance. It is a well known fact that the share price of firms increases 
greatly during the time when a takeover bid is announced. Therefore, the 
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variance of stock returns increases as well around the time of announcements, 
implying non-stationality of daily variance when focussing on takeovers. 
 
Excess Return Methodology: 
The OLS estimation model is based on the Scholes–Williams procedure 
and assigns a dummy variable to measure the excess return during a holding 
period. Since this research is interested in the acquisition event, the excess 
return is assumed generated from this abnormal event of a takeover 
announcement. The excess return is also called abnormal return. It is defined as 
the difference between risky returns and risk-free returns. The formula uses a 
multiple regression model similar to the CAPM, but is expanded to measure the 
abnormal return specifically related to the takeover event. 
 
R ti, =  ∂  +   *  +    *  +    (3) i β i R tm, gi D ti, ε ti,
 
Data description in abnormal return formula: 
1) : the return on stock i on day t. R ti,
2) : the return on the CRSP value weighted market index on day t. R tm,
3) : a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the stock is held; 
otherwise, it takes the value of 0. 
D ti,
4) : the unexplained component of  represented by the disturbance 
term epsilon. 
ε ti, R ti,
5) : abnormal return for stock i. The abnormal return is generated when 
a stock is held in a portfolio. 
gi
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6) : the intercept, representing the value that  is expected to occur 
when the explanatory variables  and are zero. Compared to the 





7) : the slope regression coefficients, representing the marginal effect of 
the explanatory variables  and respectively. Since on average it 
is a short stock holding period, it is assumed that , which is the 








3.6  Summary 
 
From the above description of the three models, it is found that the 
actual relationship between beta and rate of return does not correspond to the 
relationship predicted in the CAPM model. Moreover, betas are not stable from 
period to period. Using the 3-factor model creates a survivor bias. 
In my research, the OLS estimation model chosen as the one to use to 
compute the excess return for a stock. Since this research is interested in 
investing in the financially distressed firms with a high probability of 
acquisition, the stock holding period is assumed to be relatively short, up to a 
maximum of four years, with a mean of one to three years (see tables 7 and 8). 
Thus the new listing bias and skewness bias2 are small. Furthermore, in the 
abnormal return calculation (equation 3 on page 33), uses the CRSP value 
weighted market index instead of the equally weighted market index. Thus, the 
R tm,
                                                 
2 New listing bias, which arises because in event studies of long-run abnormal returns, 
sampled firms generally have a long post-event history of returns, while firms that 
constitute the index (or a reference portfolio) typically include new firms that begin 
trading subsequent to the event month. Skewness bias, which arises because long-run 
abnormal returns are positively skewed. 
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returns calculated from the OLS model will diminish the rebalancing bias3.
                                                 
3 Rebalancing bias, which arises because the compound returns of a reference portfolio, 
such as an equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic 







4.1  Introduction 
It is well known that the popularity of the model for predicting the 
likelihood of acquisition is due to the huge profit potential. The target 
shareholders in a friendly takeover are paid a premium (price above current 
stock price) between 20% and 40%, while the target shareholders in a hostile 
takeover are paid a premium of as much as 70%. Under such circumstances, the 
ability to pick takeover targets successfully could provide the basis for an 
investment strategy whereby firms with high estimated probabilities of takeover 
are invested in prior to the takeover announcement. 
Based on the above, modelling takeover likelihood can focus on the 
characteristics of firms since the characteristics of target firms are the driving 
forces behind the takeover. Thus a knowledge of these characteristics can be 
used to cast some light upon the motives underlying takeover activity (Powell 
1997). In my research, I use the multinomial-logit model that Åstebro and 
Winter (2000) developed to forecast the probability of financially troubled firms 
being acquired, going bankrupt or surviving. This chapter will discuss in detail 
the reasons for using this model. It also explains the variables used in 
composing this model and the data trimming method. 
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4.2  A Multinomial-Logit Model 
The multinomial-logit model predicts three possible outcomes of 
financial distress: survival, acquisition and failure. This model specifies the 
probability of each outcome as a function of some vectors of measured 
characteristics for a distressed firm. The most important reason for 
distinguishing between different outcomes of financial distress is, for banking 
practices, recovery rates might differ substantially between firms that are 
actually liquidated and firms that are acquired by other firms (Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian 1998). 
The prediction model developed is based on data for firms assumed to 
be in financial distress, as given by a ZSCORE <= 0.5. It specifies the functional 
relationship between a firm’s characteristics and its takeover likelihood for a 
given time period of distress. The multinomial logit model specifies the 
probability  that firm i will belong to outcome j (e.g., failure if j = 0, survival 
if j = 1 or acquisition if j = 2) as a function of some vectors of measured 



















is a vector of parameters. There are two vectors of regressors, one 
vector for each outcome j = 1, j=2. The third outcome of the other two can 
be computed from using the vectors of the two outcomes j = 1 and j = 2 
since  = 1. Thus, the normalization ijP 00 =β  is imposed. Therefore, 














=      (5) 
The parameters of the model are provided from the paper “The 
Probability of Failure, Survival and Acquisition of Firms in Financial Distress” 
(Åstebro and Winter 2000). The characteristics of firm i that are chosen  to 
feature in this prediction model of acquisition are indicated as . The input 
variables for this model are explained in the next topic on “input variables”. 
xi xi
 
4.3  Input Variables 
The input variables in the prediction model are accounting variables. 
They consist of (1) cash position, (2) leverage, (3) liquidity (4) profitability, (5) 
the value of a firm’s intangible assets, (6) the value of a firm’s R&D expenses, 
(7) estimated firm age and its square, and (8) firm size measured by total sales. 
The data description can be seen in table 1. 
 
Variables Descriptions 
Age time period from the entry year when a stock 
enters the stock market to the year when a firm 
enters financial distress as defined by a zscore 
<= 0.5 
Size total sales 
Cash position cash/total assets 
Leverage total debt/total assets 
Liquidity current assets/current liabilities 
Profitability net income/total assets 
R&D R&D expenses/total sales 
Intangible assets intangible assets/sales 
 




When calculating age, the entry year is derived from a field called the 
beginning date, which is denoted by “begdt”, from the CRSP daily stock file. 
Except for this data item, all other data are taken from the COMPUSTAT files. 
 
4.4  Data Trimming 
The influence of outliers can be severe in regression analysis 
particularly for ratios of two potentially miss-measured quantities. In Åstebro 
and Winter’s sample, the value of the above accounting variables are trimmed at 
the 99th percentile in the sample period from 1980 to 1989. In this research, 
these values are updated at the 99th and 95th confidence levels for the expanded 
sample period from 1979 to 1998 to avoid influence of outlier data. Table 2 lists 
the trimming procedure4: 
 
Trim all non-null financial variables 
95% confidence 99% confidence 
t(1-a/2; v) =t(0.975;v) = 
1.960 






























 - stddev * 
t(0.995; v) 
Mean 
 + stddev* 
t(0.995; v) 
firmsize 12502 81.4996 165.2986 -242.4856 405.4849 -344.3095 507.3088 
cashposition 12563 4.7747 28.6759 -51.4301 60.9795 -69.0945 78.6439 
leverage 12309 19.0085 94.6405 -166.4868 204.5039 -224.7854 262.8024 
liquidity 12968 3.2612 36.7518 -68.7724 75.2949 -91.4116 97.9340 
profitability 12926 2.6484 24.6261 -45.6188 50.9157 -60.7885 66.0854 
rdexpenses 1406 4.2312 12.9907 -21.2307 29.6931 -29.2330 37.6954 
intangible 5088 10.0595 58.4064 -104.4170 124.5361 -140.3953 160.5144 
 
Table 2: Accounting data trimmed at 99th and 95th confidences 
 
                                                 
4 v = n-1 > 120 where n is number of records for the variable in the database. 
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The research also considers the case where missing values occur in the 
above accounting variables. The rules to deal with missing values are 
summarized as below: 
• INTANGIBLE: when missing, the data item is assumed to be zero. 
• RDEXPENSES: when missing, the data item is assumed to be zero. 
• AGE: Age cannot be null, otherwise, this record is invalid. 
• FIRMSIZE, LIQUIDITY, CASHPOSITION, LEVERAGE,  
PROFITABILITY: when missing, the industry mean values are used instead. 
Industry mean values are computed across all firms in the corresponding 3-digit 
industry code. 
In order to control measurement and functional form problems, Åstebro 
and Winter’s used dummy variables which are therefore implemented here as 
well. There are three dummy variables used in the referenced paper. One, called 
the cash-dummy, takes the value of 1 when a negative value of the cash-position 
variable is observed. Another is called profitability-dummy and is assigned to a 
value of 1 when profitability is negative. The last dummy variable, called the 
age-dummy, was used to indicate when age was estimated. This is no longer 
used since the real age of a firm can be calculated using the method that was 
defined in the above data description. 
 
4.5  Summary 
Literature studies show that the use of a binomial specification to model 
takeover likelihood is likely to be incorrect and conclusions based on such a 
model are likely to be misleading and result in incorrect inferences regarding the 
characteristics of firms subject to takeover (Powell 1997). The multinomial 
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framework in which the outcomes of financial distress are classified into 
survival, acquisition and failure is shown to be a better specification than the 
binomial specification (Åstebro and Winter 2000). Applying the multinomial-
logit model serves two purposes in my research. 
First, it can examine how the characteristics of firms that are taken over 
differ from those of firms going bankrupt and surviving. Second, since the 
model is based solely on the characteristics of firms, the optimal cut-off 
probability of acquisition is used as a fundamental stock entry rule in order to 




Objective Function, Data and Analysis Design 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In order to examine the acquisition model described in the previous 
chapter, I want to use a robust data sample which includes all potential firms 
that have a high probability of being acquired. Since the acquisition model is a 
function of the characteristics of a firm, yearly accounting data is used to 
compute the probability of acquisition. The daily market data is used to compute 
the stock abnormal return. These two data sets will be integrated to create the 
expanded data source. What are the data extraction rules that can be developed 
to maximize the inclusion of all financially distressed firms? This question will 
be addressed here. 
This chapter also discusses two financial distress indicators: the 
ZSCORE, a measure of bankruptcy, and SPCSRM, the rating by Standard and 
Poor’s. Survival analysis is used to examine these financial distress indicators as 
screening mechanisms for financially distressed firms. 
The objective function uses the OLS estimation model to compute the 
excess return for each stock. This chapter examines the decision rules that are 
set up to determine the values for all variables such as the occurrence of the 
missing values and the occurrence of coded description instead of actual values 
for  and  in the function. 
gi
tm ,R ti , R
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5.2  Definitions of Financial Distress Indicators 
The ZSCORE, defined as a measure of bankruptcy by Altman (1968), is 
a weighted sum of five financial ratios: (1) working capital over total assets, (2) 
retained earnings over total assets, (3) earnings before interest and taxes over 
total assets, (4) market value of equity over book value of total liabilities, and 
(5) sales over total assets. Altman (2000) suggests that the ZSCORE model is an 
accurate forecaster of failure for up to two years prior to distress. If a value less 
than 1.81 is returned, there is a high probability of bankruptcy. If a value greater 
than 3.0 is returned, there is a low probability of bankruptcy (COMPUSTAT 
files). In my research, the ZSCORE was examined as a financial indicator for 
predicting financially distressed firms. 
SPCSRM stands for S&P common stock ranking of Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s. In the COMPUSTAT files, SPCSRM is explained as an 
appraisal of past performance of a stock’s earnings and dividends and the 
stock’s relative standing at the end of company’s current fiscal year. Growth and 
stability of earnings and dividends are key elements in establishing Standard & 
Poor’s earnings and dividends rankings for common stocks. This rating assesses 
the likelihood of timely payment of debt having an original maturity of no more 
than 365 days. A rating of “A” means that capacity for timely payment is strong. 
A rating of “B” implies that capacity for timely payment is adequate. A rating of 
“C” indicates that capacity for timely payment of short-term obligations is 
doubtful, and a rating of “D” shows that the issue is in default or is expected to 
be in default upon maturity. A financial journal reports that fifty-six out of 
ninety-one firms that went bankrupt in the US and Canada in the first half of 
2001 had a bad credit rating between CCC and CC. Therefore, SPCSRM is 
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selected to be examined as an alternative screening mechanism in this thesis as 
well. 
Standard & Poor's Compustat codes, description of rankings, and the 
S&P ranking are presented below. 
 
SPC Code S&P Description Ranking 
7 Highest  A+ 
8 High A 
9 Above Average A- 
16 Average B+ 
17 Below Average B 
18 Lower B- 
21 Lowest C 
22 In Reorganization D 
99 Liquidation LIQ 
 
Table 3: S&P rating codes and descriptions 
 
 
5.3  Data Extraction 
This research examines firms undergoing financial distress. The 
ZSCORE as a measure of financial distress is used as a criterion to extract 
financially distressed firms. Yearly financial data on firms entering financial 
distress are extracted from the COMPUSTAT files for the period between 1979 
and 1998. Daily market data for these financially distressed firms are extracted 
from the CRSP files. These two data sets are merged with the linking file that 
maps CRSP PERMNO to COMPUSTAT GVKEY and CUSIP. All the data are 
loaded into an Oracle database. The behaviour and performance of these 
extracted firms were traced for a certain number of years following their entry 
into distress or until their shares were no longer trading. The collected data 
sample includes all potential firms that have a high probability of being 
acquired. 
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5.3.1  Sampling 
There are two criteria for data extraction. One is the cut-off ZSCORE 
value whereby a firm is indicated as being at the onset of financial distress. The 
other is the cut-off extracting years that a financially distressed firm is tracked 
following the onset of financial distress. In order to determine these two cut-off 
values, I extracted all data containing the ZSCORE, the deletion reason 
(abbreviated as “DLRSN”) and deletion date (abbreviated as “DLDTE”) from 
the COMPUSTAT files. DLRSN is a two-digit code representing the reason a 
company has been moved from the active file to the research file. The codes and 
their meanings are as follows: 
 
Code Reason for Deletion 
1 Acquisition or merger 
2 Bankruptcy 
3 Liquidation 
4 Reverse acquisition (1983 forward) 
5 No longer fits original format (1978 forward) 
6 Leveraged buyout (1982 forward) 
9 Now a private company 
10 Other (no longer files with SEC among other possible reasons) 
 
Table 4: DLRSN codes and descriptions 
 
DLDTE represents the effective date (month and year) of the acquisition, 
merger, liquidation, or other reason for deletion. Based on this large set of data, 
I analysed the percentage of acquisitions and the percentage of bankruptcies 
when the value of the ZSCORE and the number of extracting years are changed. 
Notation declaration: 
• DistressYears: is the number of years that a financially distressed firm is 
being tracked after the onset of distress. 
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• Percentage of acquisitions (abbreviated as “F(A)”): is defined as the 
number of firms that are acquired within the time period of the distressYears 
over the total number of extracted firms. 
• Percentage of bankruptcies (abbreviated as “F(B)”): is defined as the 
number of firms that go bankrupt within the time period of the distressYears 
over the total number of extracted firms. 
 
5.3.2  Observations 
When the distressYears is controlled at 3, 4, or 5 years, F(A) and F(B) 
are computed by simulating the ZSCORE from 0 to 12 in steps of 0.1. The 
following observations are found: 
1) The curve of F(A) vs. ZSCORE is an up trend curve for the distressYears of 
3, 4, or 5. In other words, when the ZSCORE increases, F(A) increases for 
all the different distressYears. (See figure 1) 













Figure 1: F(A) vs. ZSCORE when the distressYears = 4 
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2) F(A) reaches its maximum value of 2.9 when distressYears is 3, but this 
maximum value changes to 2.5 and 2.4 when the distressYears value 
increases to 4 and 5 respectively. The details are listed in table 5. The table 
shows that when the distressYears value increases, the number of firms 
being acquired decreases, implying that a financially distressed firm has a 
high probability of being acquired in the 3rd or 4th year after the onset of 
distress, and has less probability of undergoing acquisition when the number 
of distress years is longer. 
 
Maximum F(A) ZSCORE #DistressYears 
2.9 6.1 3 
2.5 8.3 4 
2.4 7.1 5 
 
Table 5: Maximum F(A) for the different distressYears 
 
 
3) The curve of F(B) vs. ZSCORE is a down trend curve when the value of 
distressYears is 3, 4, or 5. In other words, when the ZSCORE increases, 
F(B) decreases for all the different distressYears. (see figure 2) 
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Figure 2: F(B) vs. ZSCORE when the distressYears = 4 
 
4) F(B) reaches its maximum value of 1.6 when distressYears is 3, but this 
maximum value of F(B) decreases to 1.2 and 0.7 when the value of 
distressYears increases to 4 and 5 respectively. The details can be seen in 
table 6. This illustrates that when the value of distressYears increases, the 
number of firms going bankrupt decreases as well. It implies that the longer 
a firm can tolerate distress the less likely that the firm will go bankrupt. 
Maximum F(B) ZSCORE DistressYears 
1.6 0.0 3 
1.2 0.2 4 
0.7 0.8 5 
 
Table 6: Maximum F(B) for the different distressYears 
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From the above observations, It can be seen that when the ZSCORE 
increases, F(A) also increases, but the F(B) decreases. It can also be seen that 
when the number of the distress years is longer, the total number of firms being 
acquired or going bankrupt decreases. It implies that the financially distressed 
firms have a high probability of undergoing acquisition or bankruptcy in the 
early stages after the onset of financially distress. On the other hand, when a 
firm endures through a longer number of distress years, the firm may be 
successful in internally restructuring itself. The result is the number of firms 
undergoing acquisition or bankruptcy goes down if they experience a longer 
period of financial distress. 
 
5.3.3  Cut-off Values for the ZSCORE and Extracting Years 
There are two reasons to determine an appropriate ZSCORE cut-off 
value: 1) having as large a proportion of acquisitions as possible, while 2) 
allowing for a reasonable predictive accuracy of financial distress because the 
ZSCORE does not predict bankruptcy events when the value of the ZSCORE > 
6, and nor does it predict acquisition events when the value of the ZSCORE is 
beyond 5. 
In order to derive these values, I intended to use the mapping theory to 
maximize both the percentage of acquisitions and the percentage of 
bankruptcies. The mathematical procedure is as follows: 
Objective:  
   Maximize (F (A) + F (B)) 
Subject to:  
  ZSCORE 
  distressYears (t) 
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The optimal solution for (F(A) + F(B)) with the ZSCORE variable and 
the distressYears variable is listed in table 7: 
 
DistressYears (t) 3 4 5 
Max (F(A) + F(B)) 3.38 3.09 2.78 
ZSCORE 2.1 3.1 7.1 
 
Table 7: Maximum (F(A) + F(B)) vs. ZSCORE for the different distressYears 
 
In this research, I also applied the mapping theory to examine a 
ZSCORE of less than 0.5 as a financial indicator to extract the financially 
distressed firms because a ZSCORE of less than 0.5 is a score low enough to 
guarantee virtually no false positives (Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 1977), 
(Altman 1984). The result is that the sum of F(A) and F(B) decreases when the 
value of distressYears increases, which is similar to the result obtained by 
simulating the value of the ZSCORE (See table 8). 
 
 
DistressYears(t) 3  4 5 
F(A) + F(B) 3.02 2.80 1.76 
 
Table 8: Sum of F(A) and F(B) vs. distressYears when ZSCORE = 0.5 
 
 
From tables 7 and 8, it can be seen that the optimal solution is 
constrained by the distressYears variable. The rules used for data collection 
attempted to include as many potential financially distressed firms as possible. 
So it is necessary to get a large data sample. Increasing the value of ZSCORE 
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can produce a large sample. For example, when the value of distressYears is 4, 
the percentage of acquisitions and bankruptcies increases from 2.8 to 3.09 as the 
value of ZSCORE increases from 0.5 to 3.1. However, increasing the sample 
beyond ZSCORE > 6 is useless as the ZSCORE does not discriminate failures. 
Based on the requirements of the data sample, the final solutions for the cut-off 
values for ZSCORE and number of extracting years are: 
1) Number of extracting years = 4 
2) Cut-off value of the ZSCORE = 3.1 
Although the optimal solution for the number of extracting years is 3 
and the cut-off value of the ZSCORE is 2.12, the final solutions for the number 
of extracting years expands to 4 years and the cut-off value of ZSCORE takes 
3.1. The major reason to use 4 years for the number of extracting years is that I 
want to be sure to move beyond the values that generate maximum sampling 
efficiency and can then in the analysis reduce sample size to that which is 
optimal as judged by this analysis to check for robustness of this sampling 
choice. 
In short, the rules of data extraction from the COMPUSTAT files is 
summarized as follows: 
• Extract all firms with ZSCORE <= 3.1 amongst all industries 
between 1979 and 1998. 
• If a firm has multiple years with ZSCORE <= 3.1, extract the 
financial data for the firm for the first year when ZSCORE <= 3.1 is 
observed, and track the behaviour and performance of the firm for 
another continuous four years after the year of distress onset or until 
the firm’s shares were no longer trading. The decision to track a 
firm for another 4 years following their entry into distress is 
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consistent with a previous empirical study where Åstebro and 
Winter (2000) document, “Approximately 32 percent of firms likely 
to be distressed are acquired or merged with another company 
within five years of the onset of distress.” 
This collected data form the basis for analyzing abnormal returns based 
on investing in potential takeover targets. 
 


















Figure 3: Sum of F(A) and F(B) vs. ZSCORE when the distressYears = 4 
 
 
5.4  Survival Analysis 
5.4.1  Survival Time 
Definition of survival time: 
Survival is defined as the time starting from the beginning of financial 
distress until one of several possible events happens. These possible events are 
defined as acquisition, bankruptcy, liquidation and other deleting reasons that 
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cause the firm to be deleted from the active stock market. The other deleting 
reasons are described by the DLRSN code in the COMPUSTAT files. 
Formula of Functions of Survival Time: 
The distribution of survival time is usually described or characterized 
by three functions: (1) the survivorship function, (2) the probability density 
function, and (3) the hazard function. The functions for the survival time for 
stock firms are as follows: 
Survivorship function: 
S(t) = (number of firms surviving longer than year t) / 
( total # of distressed firms in the observed year) 
where: 
number of firms surviving longer than year t 
= number of distressed firms in the observed year 
 -    number of firms deleted before year t 
The purpose of s(t) is to obtain the median value of the survival function. 
 
Probability density function (also called unconditional failure rate): 
f(t)=( number of firms acquired in the interval beginning at time t) /  
(total number of distressed firms in the observed year)*(interval width) 
The purpose of f(t) is to show which time period has a high frequency of 
acquisition. 
 
Hazard function (called conditional failure rate): 
h(t) = (number of firms acquired per year in the interval) /denominator 
denominator = (number of firms surviving at t) – (0.5 * number of firms 
acquired in the interval) 
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The purpose of h(t) is to obtain the maximum value for the probability of 
acquisition. 
The survival analysis is used to compute the survival function, 
probability density function and hazard rate for different deleting events. 
 
5.4.2  Results of Survival Analysis 
There are two financial indicators, ZSCORE and SPCSRM, which are 
used as control variables in analyzing financially distressed firms. The use of 
these two financial indicators results in fairly different data sample sizes 
because the number of firms extracted with a non-null SPCSRM is much lower 
than the number of firms extracted with a non-null ZSCORE (see table 11). 
 
Results of survival analysis using the ZSCORE: 
Table 9 gives the summarized information for the survival analysis 
using two different values of ZSCORE as extraction criteria. The first criterion 
is to assign ZSCORE a cut-off value of 3.1. The other criterion is that ZSCORE 
takes the value of 0.5 as the probability of the default as a measure of distress 
because a ZSCORE of less than 0.5 is a score low enough to guarantee virtually 
no false positives (Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 1977, Altman 1984). 
The results achieved from using the two different values of ZSCORE 
are as follows: it takes 20 years to reach the median of the survivorship function 
for acquisition, bankruptcy, and other deleting reasons. The probability density 
function reaches its maximum in 3 years after the onset of distress for the 
acquisition event. See figure 4. The hazard rate reaches its peak value at 3 or 4 
years for the acquisition event. See figure 5. Another observation is that for the 
acquisition event, the maximum values of the probability density function are 
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quite low, around 2 to 3 percent. This implies that in 3 or 4 years after the onset 
of financial distress, there are 2 or 3 out of 100 financially distressed firms that 
are actually being acquired. The hazard rate data shows that in year 3 with the 
extraction criterion of ZSCORE = 3.1, the probability of acquisition in that year 
is 0.029. Thus it is concluded that the ratio of acquired firms is fairly low. 
 
Max of f(t) Max of h(t) Deleting 
reason 
ZSCORE Median of s(t) 
(year) Year Value Year Value 
0.5 > 20 years 2,3 0.018 4 0.02 Acquisition 
3.1 > 20 3 0.027 3 0.029 
0.5 >20 3 0.012 4 0.014 Bankruptcy 
3.1 >20 4 0.006 4, 5 0007 
0.5 >20 3 0.047 4 0.056 Others 
3.1 >20 4 0.029 4 0.033 
 
Table 9: Survival analysis using ZSCORE 
 
 

































































Figure 5:Hazard rate of acquisitions using ZSCORE 
 
Results of survival analysis using SPCSRM: 
Table 10 summarizes the results of the survival analysis using SPCSRM 
as an extraction criterion. I decided to extract data using the cut-off ratings: B, 
B-, and C where those rated C and below have the lowest corporate ratings. The 
detailed description of SPCSRM can be seen in table 3. The median of 
survivorship function takes 20 years for all deleting reasons which is the same 
as the result of survivorship function using ZSCORE. The probability of density 
function reaches its maximum in 1 year after the onset of distress for the 
acquisition event (see figure 6), in 2 years for the bankruptcy event, and in 5 
years for the other deleting reasons. The hazard rate takes the same number of 
years as the probability density function in reaching its peak value for different 
deleting reasons. Figure 7 displays the hazard rate of acquisition using 
SPCSRM. For the acquisition event, the maximum values for probability 
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density function and the hazard rate are higher than those using the ZSCORE, 
around 4 to 4.5 percent. It means that using SPCSRM, the acquisition event will 
be reached early, and the probability of acquisition is higher as well. 
 
Max of f(t) Max of h(t) Deleting 
 reason 
SPCSRM  Median 
of s(t)  
(year) 
Year Value Year Value 
B (>= 17) > 20 
years 
1 0.042 1 0.043 
B- (>= 18) > 20 1 0.044 1 0.045 
Acquisition 
C (>=21) >20 1 0.042 1 0.043 
Bankruptcy B (>= 17) >20 2 0.006 2 0.006 
B- (>= 18) >20 2 0.008 2 0.009  
C (>=21) >20 2 0.012 2 0.013 
B (>= 17) >20 5 0.005 5 0.007 
B- (>= 18) >20 5 0.006 5 0.007 
Others 
C (>=21) >20 5 0.007 5 0.009 
 
Table 10: Survival analysis using SPCSRM 
 
 












































Figure 7: Hazard rate of acquisitions using SPCSRM 
 
5.4.3  Conclusions 
Three results are obtained from the survival analysis by using these two 
different financial indicators. 
1) The average probability of acquisition using SPCSRM is twice as 
high as when ZSCORE is used as a selection criterion. 
2) Using SPCSRM as an indicator of financial distress, the hazard rate 
reaches its maximum in a shorter number of years than when using 
ZSCORE. 
3) As discussed above, the sample size is conditioned heavily on 
which indicator was chosen to be used to extract data for the 
financially distressed firms. There are 20047 firms extracted from 
the COMPUSTAT files. Among these firms, there are 15885 firms 
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with non-null values of ZSCORE, which comprises 79 percent of 
the total number of firms. However, there are 5766 firms with non-
null values of SPCSRM extracted from the COMPUSTAT files. 
This proportion is only around 30 percent of the total number of 
firms. The details can be seen in tables 11 and 12. Thus, in the 
survival analysis, the number of firms extracted with a non-null 
SPCSRM is much lower than the number of firms extracted with a 
non-null ZSCORE. Therefore, I can conclude that this is possibly 
one major reason for the resulting higher hazard rate using 
SPCSRM although there is no clear reason for why there would be 








All firms with 
non-null 
ZSCORE 





20047 15885 5766 
 
Table 11: Number of firms extracted from the COMPUSTAT files 
 
 
ZSCORE SPCSRM Financial 













Table 12: Number of the distressed firms extracted using financial indicators 
 
Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that because of the larger  
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sample it provides due to less missing data, the ZSCORE should be used as the 
first screening mechanism in extracting financial distressed firms, and SPCSRM 
can be considered as an alternative screening mechanism. 
 
5.5  Daily Excess Return 
In the financial literature, the linear predictability and nonlinearity 
predictability of stock excess returns are heavily investigated. Qi (1999) 
examines the relationship between the excess returns and the predicting 
variables using a nonlinear neural-network model. The linear regression model 
is the most popular model found in studies of stock return prediction, and 
therefore applied in the excess returns estimation measure. The OLS estimation 
model, which is studied in chapter 3, is examined for the excess return 
prediction. The decision rules in the excess return calculation and excess return 
optimization are discussed in very detail as follows: 
 
5.5.1  Decision Rules Used in the Excess Return Calculation 
The firms in financial distress are selected without replacement from the 
population of all firms, which have their daily stock returns  available on the 
CRSP files. A value weighted stock index return  is obtainable from the 
CRSP files. The following decision rules are used when computing the daily 





1. Determine the event observation time period 
Data from the CRSP files is split into two parts: testing data and 
validating data. The testing data covers the ten year period from the beginning 
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of trading in 1980 to the end of trading in1989. The validating data covers the 
eight year period from 1990 to 1998. 
Therefore, the event observation time period for testing of the 
acquisition model is initialized as: 
• event observation beginning date denoted by eventBegDt : 
1/Jan/1980 
• event observation ending date denoted by eventEndDt : 
31/Dec/1989 
The event observation time period for validation of the acquisition 
model is initialized as: 
• event observation beginning date denoted by eventBegDt : 
1/Jan/1990 
• event observation ending date denoted by eventEndDt: 31/Dec/1998 
 
2. Determine a stock’s beginning trading date (denoted by Begdt) 
Begdt is the first day that a stock enters any stock market. The value of 
Begdt is derived from the CRSP daily file. 
 
3. Determine the date to start tracking a stock 
This date is called the tracking beginning date (denoted by track_begdt). All 
stocks trading between eventbegDt and eventEndDt are targets of interest to be 
investigated. The beginning of tracking date uses the later time of the event 
observation beginning date and a stock’s beginning trading date. The formula to 
calculate track_begdt is: 
track_begdt  =  max (begDt, eventBegDt) 
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4. Determine the date when a stock starts to become financially distressed 
(denoted by distressBegDt) 
When a firm meets the criterion of being below a given value of the 
ZSCORE, the last day of the current fiscal year (@DAY(DATEYR)) from the 
COMPUSTAT files is assigned to the distressBegDt. 
 
5. Determine the date when a stock is acquired (denoted by acquistionDt) 
When a firm meets the cut-off probability of acquisition model (equation 5 
on page 37), the date computed using the function @DAY(DATEYR) is 
assigned to acquistionDt. 
 
6. Determine the announcement date (denoted by announceDt) 
This date is required if and only if a firm is undergoing acquisition. In the 
testing period, the state of a firm is determined either by the data item called 
“research company reason for deletion” (abbreviated as “DLRSN”) from the 
COMPUSTAT files, or by the data item called “delisting code” (abbreviated as 
“DLSTCD”) from the CRSP delisting events file. When DLRSN takes a value 
of 1, or DLSTCD is assigned a code between 200 and 390 (code description can 
be seen in appendix 1), a firm is declared to be acquired. The announcement 
date then takes the value of the distribution declaration date (abbreviated as 
“DCLRDT”) from the CRSP distribution events file. 
The investment analysis reveals that the share price goes up dramatically  
during the days surrounding the acquisition announcement, thus showing that 
the acquisition event is associated with its announcement in the media. 
However, in the cross-sectional data analysis, there are some observations 
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which are not consistent with such announcement effects. The details are listed 
as below: 
1) Not all acquisitions have their announcement dates recorded in the 
CRSP distribution event files. Around 36% of acquisition firms have 
announcement dates recorded. See table 13. 
Data sources for acquired firms COMPUSTAT CRSP files 
Condition for an acquisition DLRSN = 1 DLSTCD = 200 to 390 
With announcement date Yes No Yes No 
Number of acquisition firms 1417 2513 2045 3488 
Percentage of firms with  
announcement days 
36.1 63.9 37.0 63.0 
 
Table 13: Acquisition firms with announcement date 
 
Based on these data, the decision rules to deal with in this case are 
defined as follows: 
• Use DLSTCD from the CRSP files as a control variable rather than 
DLRSN to indicate the acquisition event. There are two reasons for 
making this rule. The first is that the number of acquisitions found with 
announcement dates by using DLSTCD from the CRSP files is almost 
double the number of acquisition firms found by using DLRSN from the 
COMPUSTAT files. The second reason is that firms recorded in the 
COMPUSTAT files may not have their market data information in the 
CRSP files; however, firms residing in the CRSP files have their 
corresponding accounting data information in the COMPUSTAT files. 
The latter condition is due to the fact that the linking file does not have 
a match between all COMPUSTAT identification numbers and the 
CRSP identification numbers. 
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• Treat a firm with a null announcement date as a survival. From the 
above table 13, there are 3488 acquisition firms indicated by DLSTCD 
with null announcement dates from the CRSP files. Among these firms, 
there are 961 of them which are found in the survival category in the 
COMPUSTAT files due to a null value found in their DLRSN code. 
Furthermore, there are only 18 firms that went bankrupt as indicated by 
their DLRSN value of 2. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
firms without announcement dates can be treated as survival firms. 
2) An acquisition may have one or more announcement dates. Since the 
prediction model is used to predict the likelihood of takeovers, the first 
announcement date after the onset of financial distress is more 
meaningful for this research, and is used from here on. 
 
7. Determine the distressYears 
This research is interested in tracking firms over a short time period, for 
example for three or four years after financial distress occurs. This short time 
period is denoted by the variable watchYear in the Java program. Thus the 
distress end date will be the distress beginning date (distressBegDt) plus 
watchYear. 
 
8. Determine the end date when a stock is sold (denoted by EndDt) 
It is established that a firm’s delisting date is extracted from the CRSP 
delisting events file due to the inaccuracy of DLRSN from the COMPUSTAT 
files. Therefore, the end date used is the earliest of the following three dates: 
event observation ending date, distress observation date, and delisting date. The 
formula for calculating EndDt is: 
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EndDt = Min (eventEnddt, distress observation date, dlstdt) 
 
9. Determine the value of a dummy variable  in the OLS estimation model Dt
This dummy variable reflects an investment strategy. If it takes a value of 1, 
it implies that an investor holds a stock; however, if it takes a value of 0, a stock 
is not in the investor’s portfolio. There are three scenarios that should be taken 
into consideration. 
I. Scenario 1 is associated with acquisition events. There are two cases. 
One case is when stocks being acquired with announcement dates, 
is declared as follows: Dt
Dt  = 0 between track_begdt and distressbegdt (excluding the day    
        of distress onset) 
Dt  = 1 between distressbegdt and announceDt 
Dt  = 0 between announceDt (not including announcement day)  
        and EndDt 
 The other case is when stocks being acquired without announcement 
dates. The excess returns for these stocks are computed using the same 
method in scenario 3. 
 
II. Scenario 2 is associated with failure events. DLSTCD from the crsp 
delisting event file is selected as the control variable to indicate the 
failure events. In this research, the values of the delisting code 
between 400 and 591 (code description can be seen in appendix 1) 
classify events into the liquidation and dropped categories. If a stock 
is delisted on day t and the firm goes bankrupt, liquidated or for other 
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reasons is worthless, then sell the stock on delisting day (day t). The 
following business rules are used to calculate a firm’s stock return on 
the delisting day: 
1) Since the delisting return (denoted by “DLRET”) deals with the 
bankruptcy and liquidation events or for other reasons are 
declared worthless in the CRSP delisting event file, the value of 
DLRET already indicates a 100% loss as per descriptions quoted 
from the CRSP delisting event file: 
• “If there is evidence that no distribution will ever be paid to 
shareholders, then the stock is considered worthless. The 
delisting return is set to –1 ( i.e. a 100% loss). 
• If there is evidence that the stock has been declared worthless, 
then the delisting return is set to –1 (i.e. a 100% loss).” 
Therefore, a firm’s stock return on the delisting day uses the 
formula: 
 daily stock return (“RET”) + delisting return (“DLRET”) 
2) From the data retrieved from the CRSP delisting event file, it is 
observed that there are 84 firms with a null delisting return when 
the delisting code falls in either of the liquidation or dropped 
categories. Because there are no distributions paid to 
shareholders, those stocks are treated as worthless. The delisting 
return is subjectively assigned to a value of –1 (i.e. a 100% loss.) 
3) In the data analysis, there are a large number of negative values 
appearing in the results. These numbers are not delisting returns, 
but are actual codes used to describe the reason for the missing 
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delisting returns. The descriptions of the missing delisting return 
codes are shown in table 14. 
 
Code Reason For Missing Return 
-55 CRSP has no sources to establish a value after delisting or is 
unable to assign a value to one or more known distributions 
after delisting 
-66 more than 10 trading periods between a security’s last price 
and its first available price on a new exchange. 
-88 security is still active. 
-99 security trades on a new exchange after delisting, but CRSP 
currently has no sources to gather price  information. 
 
Table 14: Missing delisting return codes 
 
When a stock with a missing delisting return code is found, the 
following rules are used for the delisting return: 
• delisting return = -1 when missing code is –55. 
• delisting return = 0 when missing code is –66, -88 or -99. 
4) takes a value of 0 from a stock’s tracking day to the trading 
day previous to the date of distress onset, and takes a value of 1 
from the onset of distress day untill the delisting day. It is 
displayed as: 
Dt
Dt   = 0 between track_begdt and distressbegdt (excluding 
the day of distress onset) 
Dt   = 1 between distressbegdt and EndDt 
 
III. Scenario 3 is associated with survival events. takes a value of 0 
from a stock’s tracking day to the trading day previous to the day of 
the distress onset, and takes a value of 1 from the onset of distress 
years until the end of tracking year. The formula for the dummy 
Dt
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variable is the same as described in item 4) of case 2 above – failure 
events. 
 
10. Determine the value of a stock daily stock return (denoted by “RET”) 
When a large negative value occurs, RET is defined as the holding period 
total return in the CRSP daily file. RET is “the return for a sale on the given 
day. It is based on a purchase on the most recent time previous to this day when 
the security had a valid price. Usually, this time is the previous calendar 
period”. A series of special return codes that specify the reason a return is 
missing is shown in table 15. 
 
Code Reason For Missing Return 
-66 valid current price but no valid previous price. Either first price, 
unknown exchange between current and previous price, or more 
than 10 periods between time t and the time of the preceding 
price t. 
-77 not trading on the current exchange at time t 
-88 outside the range of the security’s price range 
-99 missing return due to missing price at time t; usually due to 
suspension in trading or trading on unknown exchange 
 
Table 15: Missing return codes 
 
When the trading day has the security’s daily return indicated by one  
of the reason codes in table 15, or null, then that particular trading day will not 
be counted in the trading period. The trading time period will thus be 
compressed by excluding the days when RET is actually a reason code or null. 
 
11.  Determine the stock holding days (denoted by holdingDays) 
Holding days are calculated as the number of days a stock is held in the  
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portfolio. In other words, holding days is the number of days when the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1. 
 
5.5.2  Daily Excess Return Optimization 
The daily excess return calculation for stock i applies an OLS 
estimation model to control risk and maximize the return on investment. The 
formula of the objective function to compute excess return for stock i is 
equation 3 on page 33. 
In this OLS model, the purpose is to minimize error and optimize a 
stock’s excess return. There are two scenarios to be considered. The first 
scenario is based on a dummy variable  having the mixed values of 0 and 1. 
In the second scenario, the dummy variable  only takes a value of 1 from 




Scenario 1: multi-regression model 
 
R ti, =  ∂  +   *  +    *  +    (3) i β i R tm, gi D ti, ε ti,
 
The above formula for each stock can be written in matrix form as: 
 
iii BXy ε+=  
where: 
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yi  = 





























































































The least square estimator b for the coefficients in B satisfies the following: 
 
[ ] 0)()( =−′−∂∂ XbyXbyb  
 
As a result:  
XXXb ′′= −1)(  y 
Therefore, the excess return for the stock i is the third value in the matrix  gi b 1,3
Scenario2: Simple linear regression model 
When  = 1 for all values of t, abnormal return formula is written: D ti,
R ti, =  +   *  +      (6) gi β i R tm, ε ti,
 
It is simplified using matrix function as: 
iii BXy ε+=  
 
so: 
























































































The least square estimates iig β
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where n is the number of trading days for stock i and  is the excess return. gi
 
5.6  Conclusions 
 Given the above decision rules used in the excess return calculation, it 
can be seen that there are two criteria for selecting stocks into a portfolio. The 
ZSCORE as a measure of bankruptcy is used as the first criterion to choose the 
financially distressed firms. When the ZSCORE for a stock is lower than 0.5, 
the stock starts being tracked as a financially troubled firm. The dummy variable 
 is assigned a value of 0. When the second criterion for the cut-off 
probability is met, the stock is brought into the portfolio. The dummy variable 
then takes a value of 1. 
D ti,
D ti,
In my research, I track stocks for 3 years after their onset of financial 
distress. This implies that if there is no delisting date occurring within 3 years, 
the stocks are all sold at the end of the distress years. 
The stock holding period is computed as the time from when the stock 
is bought until the stock is sold. The length of the holding period is shorter than 
the distress years because it starts being recorded when the probability of 
acquisition meets the cut-off value and is also compressed by excluding the days 






6.1  Introduction 
Simulation analysis is a powerful problem-solving technique. Hoover 
and Perry (1989) define simulation as follows: 
“The process of designing a mathematical or logical model of a real 
system and then conducting computer-based experiments with the 
model to describe, explain, and predict the behaviour of the real 
system.” 
Simulation models can describe very complex systems. They can be 
used to predict systems which are not yet in existence or experiment with 
existing systems without actually altering the system. However, simulation 
models have their deficiencies. There are no closed form solutions to simulation 
models; each change of input variables requires a separate solution or set of 
runs. Therefore, complex simulation models are costly and time consuming to 
build and run. 
Generally speaking, simulation can be applied when either of the 
following conditions is met. The first is when the assumptions required for the 
analytical model are not sufficiently well satisfied by the real system. The other 
is when there is great difficulty in forming the mathematical formula for the 
analytical model. Simulation models, to some degree, reflect the appropriate 
amount of realism and accuracy in the system description and provide the 
optimum solutions. 
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In simulation models, the relationships among the elements of the 
system are expressed using an algorithm encoded in a computer program. 
Unlike analytical models, simulation models do not provide direct answers but 
reveal the system’s properties as the computer executes the algorithm. The 
simulation results must be analyzed before conclusions can be made about the 
system’s properties. 
 
6.2  Purposes of Simulation 
In the stock market, investment choices are made in an attempt to 
balance risk and return. The main challenge for investors is to determine the 
best portfolio on a given investment horizon, which may be short, medium, or 
long term. This horizon is based on quantifiable expectations of risk and returns. 
The portfolio used in my research attempts to 1) select as many 
acquired financially distressed firms as possible in a given trading period, while 
2) avoiding choosing firms which have a high probability of bankruptcy. The 
reasoning is that acquisitions can bring huge profits to an investor, but 
bankruptcies can make investors incur great losses. 
To maximize the value of the portfolio, three parameters are simulated: 
the length of a stock’s holding days, the ZSCORE and the probability of 
acquisition (abbreviated as “P(A)”).  The length of a stocks holding days is 
simulated from 1 year to 3 years by incrementing in steps of 1. The ZSCORE 
ranges between 0.55 to 3.1 (cut-off ZSCORE value), and the probability of 
acquisition varies from 0.5 to 1. Both the ZSCORE and the probability of 
                                                 
5 a ZSCORE of less than 0.5 is a score low enough to guarantee virtually no false 
positives (Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 1977, Altman 1984). 
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acquisition are simulated by incrementing in steps of 0.1. The simulation results 
will address the following questions: 
1) Can the acquisition model predict takeover’s behaviour? 
2) Can a particular choice of the ZSCORE increase the return for investors? 
3) Is the null hypothesis for daily excess return = 0 accepted or rejected? 
 
 6.3  Estimation of cut-off probability of acquisition 
To test the predictive ability of the acquisition model the optimal cut-off 
probability of acquisition has to be estimated. Two methods are applied in 
simulating the probability of acquisition to derive the cut-off probability of 
acquisition. The first is to compare the predicted versus the actual corporate 
event. The other method is to compute abnormal return for each stock and to 
compute average daily return across all stocks. Results derived from these two 
methods will be used to estimate the cut-off probability and validate the 




6.3.1  Comparing the Predicted versus  the Actual Corporate 
Events 
The purpose of this section is to derive a cut-off probability of 
acquisition by examining the relationship between predicted and actual 
corporate events for various cut-off values of the probability of acquisition. I 
want to find a cut-off probability of acquisition having the most firms, which are 
predicted to be acquired, being actually acquired within the given trading time, 
and at the same time, having the fewest firms, which are predicted to be 
acquired, actually go bankrupt or still survive. 
 74
A ZSCORE of less than 0.5 is chosen as the default probability of 
distress for selecting the financially distressed firms in an estimation sample 
since a ZSCORE of less than 0.5 is a score low enough to guarantee virtually no 
false positives (Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 1977, Altman 1984). 
For all financially distressed firms I vary the estimated cut-off 
probability from 0.5 to 1.0 by incrementing it in steps of 0.1. When the 
probability of acquisition for a stock meets or exceeds the value of the estimated 
cut-off probability, the stock is selected into the portfolio. 
The value of DLSTCD which describes delisting reason is used from 
the CRSP delisting event file to indicate if the predicted targets are actually 
targets. When DLSTCD takes a value between 200 and 390 (code descriptions 
can be seen in appendix A, a firm is considered to be in either the acquisition or 
merge category. When DLSTCD has a value from 400 to 591 a firm is 
categorized as a failure. When DLSTCD has a value which is not in the above 
two categories a firm is put into the survival category. 
The distribution of estimated acquisition probability for targets and non-
targets in the estimation sample is described in figure 8. 
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Percentage of each event 























Percentage of acquisition vs.
probability of acquisition
Percentage of failure vs.
probability of acquisition
Percentage of survival vs.
probability of acquisition
 
Figure 8: Distribution of estimated P(A) for targets and non-targets 
 
There are three conclusions that can be derived from the above analysis: 
1) The acquisition model lacks accuracy in predicting actual takeovers. 
From the above curve it is observed that when the estimated cut-off 
probability increases the percentage of actual acquired targets does not increase 
very much. Furthermore, when the cut-off probability takes the maximum value 
of 1.0 the percentage of actual acquisition reaches only 50%. It is concluded that 
the acquisition model lacks accuracy. 
 
2) There is a positive relationship between the model’s prediction and  
outcomes for higher predicted values. 
Although, the accuracy of acquisition prediction is not high, the 
acquisition model does forecast the trend that the percentage of actual acquired 
targets increases when the probability of acquisition increases, and also the 
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trend that the percentage of failure decreases when the probability of acquisition 
increases. Therefore, to some degree, this model has a certain amount of 
applicability in predicting different event categories. 
 
3) The best cut-off probability of acquisition may be a value of 0.9. 
Although the curve of survival is very flat, the other two curves of 
acquisition and failure events reveal some things. One interesting outcome is 
that when the estimated cut-off probability takes a value of 0.8, the acquisition 
event starts increasing and the failure event begins to decrease. The second 
important finding is that when the probability of acquisition takes a value of 0.9 
or above these two curves have very steep slopes, indicating that the value of 
0.9 may be chosen as the cut-off probability of acquisition if necessary. 
 
6.3.2  Computing Abnormal Returns 
Two types of portfolio returns that are computed:  
• Average daily portfolio return6 is defined as the sum of individual 
stock daily excess return '  which is the abnormal returns  divided by stock 
i’s holding days, averaged over the total number of stocks held in a portfolio. 
gi gi
• Average holding-period portfolio return is defined as the sum of  
individual stock’s  abnormal returns  divided by the total number of stocks 
held in a portfolio. 
gi
Using this method I intend to find an optimal cut-off probability where 
both types of portfolio return get maximized. The two parameters are simulated 
when the length of the stock holding period is set to 3 years. The ZSCORE and 
                                                 
6A stock daily return doesn’t exclude the case when the stock’s holding day is 0. 
 77
P(A) are simulated from 0.5 to 1.0 by incrementing in steps of 0.1. The data 
from the simulation results is shown to be quite accurate. Data validation and 
methods limitation can be see in appendix D. 
The following observations are found from the simulation results: 
1) Table 16 describes the relationship between the daily portfolio return, the 
ZSCORE and P(A). The weighted average return is calculated as each cell 
value of return times its number of observations and divided by the total 
number of observations. For each value of the ZSCORE, the weighted 
average daily return receives a negative value or is close to zero. Moreover, 
the values of weighted average daily return are very similar for the different 
values of the ZSCORE. It means that there is little impact of the ZSCORE 
on daily return. On the other hand, for each value of P(A), when the 
estimated probability is above 0.9 the weighted average return starts 
increasing. For example, when the estimated probability varies between 0.9 
and 1.0, the weighted average daily return increases from 0.107% to 
0.589%. 
 
                    
  ZSCORE 









0.5 -0.068% -0.037% -0.048% -0.072% -0.046% -0.033%
 
-0.050% 
0.6 0.012% 0.042% 0.024% -0.008% 0.011% 0.021% 0.017% 
0.7 -0.224% -0.043% -0.062% -0.056% -0.063% -0.035% -0.077% 
0.8 -0.001% 0.024% 0.041% -0.008% 0.001% -0.249% -0.044% 
0.9 0.294% 0.283% 0.249% 0.155% 0.151% -0.261% 0.107% 





return -0.054% 0.004% -0.010% -0.033% -0.017% -0.022% 
 
 
Table 16: The relationship between daily return, ZSCORE and P(A) 
 
2) The relationship between the holding-period portfolio return and the 
estimated cut-off probability for each ZSCORE is listed in table 17. The 
portfolio has a positive holding period return. When P(A) is 0.8 the portfolio 
receives the minimum value (0.081%) of weighted average holding period 
return, but when P(A) = 1.0 the portfolio reaches its maximum value 
(0.501%) of weighted average holding-period return. For the different 
values of the ZSCORE, the weighted average holding period return is very 
close to 0.4%. It implies that the ZSCORE doesn’t have a significant impact 




                    
  ZSCORE 











0.5 0.431% 0.451% 0.417% 0.361% 0.391% 0.386% 0.404% 
0.6 0.502% 0.517% 0.477% 0.429% 0.450% 0.438% 0.467% 
0.7 0.222% 0.421% 0.372% 0.333% 0.348% 0.358% 0.344% 
0.8 0.186% 0.208% 0.199% 0.093% 0.094% -0.178% 0.081% 
0.9 0.378% 0.354% 0.306% 0.192% 0.178% -0.259% 0.147% 






return 0.391% 0.462% 0.422% 0.369% 0.390% 0.364% 
 
 
Table 17: The relationship between holding-period return, ZSCORE and P(A) 
 
To summarize, there are three conclusions that can be derived from the 
analysis of the above observations. 
First, there seems to be no cut-off probability of acquisition which can 
be derived using this method because weighted average return varies when P(A) 
increases. The optimal cut-off probability is used to maximize both daily 
portfolio return and holding-period portfolio return. In the above tables 16 and 
17, before P(A) reaches its maximum value of 1.0 the weighted average daily 
return receives its maximum value when P(A) = 0.9, but the weighted average 
holding-period return achieves its maximum value when P(A) = 0.6. Both types 
of return reach their maximum value at different cut-off values for the 
probability of acquisition. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no optimal cut-
off probability found by examining the abnormal return method. 
Second, it is observed that both the weighted average daily return and 
weighted average holding-period return start increasing when P(A) has a value 
greater than 0.8, This may imply that investing in distressed stocks may be 
profitable irrespective of the value of P(A). 
Lastly, when the ZSCORE varies, there is little change in both the 
weighted average daily return and the weighted average holding-period return. It 
is concluded that the choice of ZSCORE does not have a significant influence 
on portfolio return. 
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6.4  Null Hypothesis Testing for Mean of Daily Abnormal Return 
From the regression analysis I want to examine the null hypothesis that 
the mean of daily abnormal return variable = 0. A t-test is used to analyze 
whether the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected. I choose a confidence level 
of 99%. The estimation sample is extracted by using ZSCORE <= 0.5 and 
having P(A) >= the estimated probability which varies between 0.5 and 1.0 The 
following formulas are used in the analysis. 
'gi








 where there are n stocks held in a sample. 
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the value of g is significantly different from zero. 
 
The daily abnormal return  for each stock is the holding period abnormal 








                                                 









mean     
( g ) 
Sample standard 
deviation 
( ) S sample
t-value 
0.5 1573 -0.068% 0.006 4.323 
0.6 1527 0.012% 0.008 0.618 
0.7 786 -0.224% 0.004 17.404 
0.8 116 -0.001% 0.002 0.079 
0.9 60 0.294% 0.002 10.163 
1.0 19 0.741% 0.005 6.104 
 
Table 18: t-statistics using the OLS estimation model 
 
 
From the above analysis, I conclude that whether g  = 0 is rejected or 
accepted depends on P(A). When P(A) takes values of 0.5, 0.7 , 0.9 and 1.0, the 
null hypothesis for g is rejected. The value of g is then significantly different 
from zero. However, when P(A) takes values of  0.6 and 0.8, the null hypothesis 
is accepted. The value of g is close to zero. Furthermore, when significant, 
g is negative in two instances and positive in the other two instances. These 
tests show that the acquisition model lacks accuracy in predicting abnormal 
returns. 
 
6.5  Benchmark results on abnormal return 
Although the acquisition model lacks forecasting accuracy, it may be 
worth investing in distressed firms irrespective of the probability of acquisition. 
When the ZSCORE is less than 0.5, the average daily return for all firms is 
0.126% and the average holding period return for all firms is 0.422% with the 
average holding days being 273. See table 19. Since 273 days is greater than the 
250 trading days in one year, the annual return for all firms can be assumed to 
be around 0.4%. In this sample, the average daily return for acquired firms is 
0.371%. The annual return for acquired firms can also be assumed to be around 
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0.5% since the average holding period return is 0.599% with the holding period 


















0.5 1573 -0.068% 0.431% 257
0.6 1527 0.012% 0.502% 257
0.7 786 -0.224% 0.222% 252
0.8 116 -0.001% 0.186% 285
0.9 60 0.294% 0.378% 296






Table 19: Statistics on total number of stocks held in a portfolio 
 
 
I also empirically studied the performance of other approaches for 
developing a return benchmark. Palepu, in his acquisition prediction test, reports 
the average daily cumulative excess return for the 625 predicted targets over the 
250 days is –1.62%. The average cumulative return for the predicted targets is 
small and hovers around zero throughout the holding period. In contrast, the 
average cumulative excess return for the subgroup of 24 predicted targets which 
actually became targets during the holding period is large. The 250-day 
cumulative excess return for the group actually being acquired is 20.98%. 
Compared to the Palepu’s prediction result, the annual excess return 
computed using the abnormal return method is positive and higher than the 
annual return derived from Palepu’s test. However, annual excess return for the 
acquired firms which I computed is only 0.5%, much lower than the annual 
return of 20.98% computed from Palepu’s test. The results from these two 
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different tests are very impressive and show that the annual excess return for all 
firms derived by the abnormal return method is in acceptable range. 
 
6.6  Statistics on Abnormal Return for the Corporate Events 
Since average excess return g i  is averaged over three different 
corporate events: acquisition, failure and survival, it is interesting to examine 
the number of stocks going into each corporate event in the portfolio, and the 
mean of their daily portfolio return for each event. 
The data sample is obtained using the distributions of acquisition 
probability and the ZSCORE less than 0.5. The statistic results are listed in table 
20, 21 and 22. 
From the results, I find that when P(A) increases the size of the sample 
decreases and the number of stocks in each corporate event decreases as well. 
When P(A) >= 0.5, the number of stocks actually being acquired is 245 out of 
1573 (15.58%) distressed firms are acquired. The number of failed stocks makes 
up a large proportion of the predicted sample. There are 1010 out of 1573 (64%) 
going bankrupt or being liquidated or deleted for other delisting reasons. There 
are 318 out of 1573 (20.22%) firms being survived. These results show that a 
large number of distressed firms failed and the number of distressed firms 
actually acquired are close to the number of firms surviving. 
The tables below also show the daily portfolio return for each corporate 
event. The average daily portfolio return for failed stocks is the lowest of all 
three groups around 0.019%. The average daily portfolio return for survival 
stocks is the highest of all three groups for the value of 0.484%. I also find that 
the average daily portfolio return for acquired firms is much higher than the 
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average daily portfolio return for failed firms. This is consistent with the view 
that investing in stocks being acquired gain more profit than investing in stocks 
going bankrupt or liquidated. 
From the average holding period, a stock that goes bankrupt or 
liquidated has the shortest holding days (214). A stock being acquired has the 
longer holding days (300) than a failed stock. A stock that survives has the 
longest trading holding days (321). The results show that the holding period is 
shorter for acquisitions and failure is obvious since these events must occur 
within the 3-year limit. Apparently bankruptcies and other failures occur earlier 
after the onset of distress than acquisition. This is consistent with the Åstebro 





















0.5 245 0.179% 0.478% 308
0.6 234 0.101% 0.409% 313
0.7 144 0.120% 0.507% 305
0.8 28 0.344% 0.528% 307
0.9 17 0.566% 0.713% 306

































0.5 1010 -0.349% 0.258% 222 
0.6 984 -0.222% 0.365% 221 
0.7 499 -0.571% -0.031% 214 
0.8 59 -0.400% -0.152% 248 
0.9 27 -0.050% 0.020% 254 
1.0 3 1.707% 1.825% 125 
Mean of return  0.019% 0.381% 214 
 
 






















0.5 318 0.634% 0.947% 331
0.6 309 0.689% 1.006% 328
0.7 143 0.640% 0.817% 327
0.8 29 0.476% 0.544% 338
0.9 16 0.586% 0.627% 357






Table 22: Statistics on number of stocks that being survived 
 
In tables 21 and 22, it is observed that when P(A) = 0.8, 0.9 or 1.0, the 
average daily portfolio return is very close to the average holding-period 
portfolio return. This is due to the fact that the stock daily return is a function of 
the stock holding days. In this case, there are more stocks having large returns 
over their short holding periods, while stocks with long holding periods have 
smaller returns. The return for those stocks having long holding periods does not 
have a significant effect on the average portfolio return. Thus, the result is that 
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the average daily portfolio return is very close to the average holding period 
portfolio return. Table 23 illustrates the distribution of both average daily return 
and average holding period return for the surviving firms extracted when P(A) 








0–9 34 2.685% 2.685% 
10-49 3 0.034% 1.013% 
50-249 25 0.005% 0.561% 
250-490 28 0.000% 0.145% 
500-750 53 0.000% 0.084% 
 
 
Table 23: The distribution of return when P(A) = 0.7 and ZSCORE <= 0.5 
 
 
6.7  Conclusions 
From the above analysis, I can answer the questions which are posed at 
the beginning of the chapter. First, the acquisition model lacks accuracy in 
predicting actual acquisitions. There is no optimal cut-off probability of 
acquisition derived from either comparing the predicted versus the actual 
corporate events or by computing abnormal return. Second, a particular choice 
of the ZSCORE between 0.5 and 1.0 has no impact on both types of portfolio 
return: daily portfolio return and holding-period portfolio return. Lastly, since 
excess returns are a random function of the cut-off probability the hypothesis 
that the average daily excess return g = 0 is randomly rejected or accepted. 
The simulation results also show that the average daily return g  across 
all values of P(A) is positive and the implied annual return is around 0.4% since 
the average holding period return is 0.422% for 273 days greater than 250 
trading days in one year. It implies that it is worthwhile to invest in financially 
distressed firms irrespective of the probability of acquisition. If the acquisition 
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model gets updated, the accuracy of likelihood of acquisition may be improved. 
The more accurate the acquisition model is, the more profits it may bring to an 
investor. Based on these two motives I am going to design the prototype of a 







A Buy-Sell Trading System 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The ability to pick takeover targets successfully in advance of the 
announcement of a bid could form the basis for a successful investment strategy. 
This is the one incentive to develop a buy-sell trading system. The model that 
Åstebro and Winter (2000) developed using a multivariate methodology will be 
used as a fundamental stock entry rule in the buy-sell system. There are two 
motives for developing this system. First, although the acquisition model was 
shown to be approximately unrelated to excess return, there might be other stock 
entry rules that show greater promise in the future. Second, this system can 
easily test the selected stock trading rules in order to optimize the investor’s 
portfolio return. 
This chapter discusses how use cases, data flow diagrams (DFDs) and 
trading rules can be used to develop a prototype for a buy-sell system. 
 
7.2  Creating Use Cases 
There are many ways to develop DFDs. Dennis and Wixom (2000) 
strongly recommend that use cases can be used as the first step in creating 
DFDs. A use case is a set of activities that the system performs to produce some 
results. Each use case describes how the system reacts to an event that occurs to 
trigger the system. There are five use cases that describe the whole system. They 
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are: screen stocks, buy stocks, sell stocks, update stock portfolio and compute 
stock portfolio return. 
For each use case, its trigger and the major inputs and outputs are 
identified. The first use case: screen stocks, is triggered by the event of an 
investor wanting to invest in stocks. The major inputs are a firm’s accounting 
data from COMPUSTAT files. The major outputs are the cut-off probability of 
acquisition and the size of the stock portfolio. The matched firms are stored in a 
stock portfolio file. 
The second use case: buy stocks, is triggered when the matched stocks 
are selected. The major inputs are market data from the CRSP files. The buying 
constraints are the limitation of the purchasing volume and a buying signal 
based on moving averages. The major outputs are the volume of each stock and 
the purchasing date. These outputs are stored in the stock portfolio file. 
The third use case: sell stocks, is triggered by any exit signal from the 
selected trading exit strategies. The major inputs are trading exit strategies such 
as financial trade stops, time stop, probability of bankruptcy, moving average 
and parabolic rules. The major outputs are the excess return of each stock sold 
and the selling date. These outputs are stored in the stock portfolio file. 
The fourth use case: compute portfolio return, is triggered when the 
trading period is over. The major inputs are the return on each existing stock, 
and the trading holding days of each stock in the portfolio. The major outputs 
are the average daily portfolio return and the average holding-period portfolio 
return. The details of these use cases can be viewed in appendix B. 
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7.3  Processing Models 
A process model is a formal way of representing how a business system 
operates. It illustrates the processes or activities that are performed and how data 
moves between them. A process model can be used to document this proposed 
system. There are many different process-modeling techniques in use today 
(Dennis and Wixom, 2000). A data flow diagram is a technique that diagrams 
the business processes and the data that passes amongst them. The set of DFDs 
simply integrates the individual use case reports. The first DFD provides a 
summary of the overall system, with additional DFDs providing increasingly 
more detail about each part of the overall business process. The main result of 
using DFDs is the decomposition of the business process into a series of DFDs. 
The context diagram has two external entities which are the investors 
and the stock market. The buy-sell trading system is the internal entity. 
Investors provide investment information such as buy and sell decisions to this 
trading system. The buy-sell system selects the stocks from the stock market if 
the buy signal occurs, and sells the stocks if the sell signal occurs. The sold 
stocks return to the stock market, and the excess stock return generated from 
this trading system is returned to investors. 
The level 0 diagram integrates the DFD fragments. Each use case is 
transferred into one process. The level 0 diagram illustrates the overall picture 
of the processes and their inter relationship very intuitively. Besides the context 
diagram and the level 0 diagrams, the level 1 diagrams specify each process in 
further detail. The processing models can be viewed in appendix C. 
 
 91
7.4  Stock Entry and Exit Rules 
Since the aforementioned model of probability of acquisition predicts 
the ability to pick stocks with some accuracy, it can be used as an investment 
strategy. In the buy-sell system, the probability of acquisition is used as the 
stock entry rule for the fundamental analysis8. A moving average indicator is 
used as a stock entry rule for the technical analysis. The moving average 
indicator is a lagging indicator, meaning that it identifies a trend or trend 
reversal after it has begun. It works equally well in trending or non-trending 
markets. 
 The decision rule for stock entry is to select the stocks that meet the cut-
off probability of acquisition and the buy signal from the moving average 
indicator. 
The decision rule for stock exit can apply the following trade exit rules: 
financial trade stops, time stop exit rule, probability of the bankruptcy indicator 
and parabolic indicator. 
1)  Financial Trade Stops 
Financial stops are based on monetary (profit/loss) criteria. An average 
directional index is used as a measure of the trend of a stock. When the price of 
the security has a down trend, a maximum loss stop is applied. When the price 
of the security has an up trend, a profit trailing stop is used instead. These two 
types of stops are implemented as follows: 
• A maximum loss stop: is trigged when a trade is losing more money 
than a specified amount. The stop loss price is displayed in the buy-
sell system for each trade. The trade is exited at the close price 
                                                 
8 This rule may be changed or dropped in the future, other rules may be added. 
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when the stop loss price is less than the high price and the close 
price. 
• A profit trailing stop: is initially set according to information based 
on the close price on that day. Trailing stops can be moved up for 
long trades or down for short trades. The profit trailing stop price is 
evaluated using the following formula:  
proftTrailingStop = closePrice – maxProfitPcnt * (closePrice –    
                                entryPrice) 
where: 
entryPrice: the price when a new trade is entered. 
maxProfitPcnt: a percentage of the maximum profit level. For example, 
10% of the maximum profit. 
 
There are two cases that should be considered: 
Case 1: if the close price is lower than the profit trailing stop price, the  
stop executes at the close price or the open price of the next day. 
Case 2: if the close price is higher than the profit trailing stop price, the  
stop is not hit. Instead, the new profit trailing stop price is adjusted using the 
new close price according to the above formula. 
 
2)  Time stop trading rule 
There are two reasons for using a time stop trading rule. First, the aim 
of an investment is to earn money within a given period of time if nothing 
happens the stock should be sold. Generally speaking, an active investor would 
set time limits on purchasing stock. Second, the number of the distress years 
after the onset of financial distress is limited. The maximum hazard of 
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acquisition for the financially distressed firms is reached around 3 or 4 years 
after entering distress. Thus at the end of the financial distress years, the 
distressed firms have either survived, gone bankrupt or have been acquired. In 
this trading system, when the time stop is reached, all securities held in the stock 
portfolio should be sold. Their excess returns are calculated using the OLS 
estimation model. 
 
3)  Probability of bankruptcy indicator 
If the updated probability of bankruptcy indicator is greater than the 
tolerance value φ , the trade is exited. The stock return is calculated at the price 
when the stock is sold. The probability of bankruptcy can be computed from 
Åstebro and Winter’s multi-nomial logit model. 
 
4)  Moving average indicator 
This is a lagging indicator, meaning that it identifies a trend or trend 
reversal after it begins. It works equally well in trending or non-trending 
markets. The trade is exited when the 5 day moving average is below the 10 day 
moving average. 
 
5)  Parabolic indicator 
This indicator is designed for use in trending markets. Once a trend has 
begun, the system allows for moderate anti-trend movements, but as the trend 
matures, the system’s protective trailing stop (referred to as “stop-and-reverse 
(SAR)” follows the price movements at a progressively closer rate. Once the 
SAR is reached, an equal and opposite position is taken in the market. 
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Formula: 
SARbuy = SAR-1 + AF(Low – SAR-1) 
SARsell = SAR-1 + AF(High – SAR-1)9 
 
7.5  Design Specifics 
In this buy-sell trading system, the user-defined trading strategies are  
set and simulation are run on historical data. The aims of a buy-sell trading 
system are: 
• Though repeated trading methods, an investor can find out the best 
trading strategy for making maximum profit. 
• Individual investors can set up their own customized trading rules 
by modifying the formula of the existing trading rules to achieve the 
best return. 
• Individuals also can learn about the decision making process and 
the risks associated with trading. 
 
There are five functional aspects of the design that should be taken into 
consideration: simulation, time track, announcements, report, and optimization. 
The simulation, announcement, reports and optimization are accessed by tabs 
                                                 
9 SAR-1: stop-and-reverse value from the previous price. 
SARbuy: stop-and-reverse price on the buy side. 
SARsell: stop-and-reverse price on the sell side. 
High: the highest price since the initial position has been taken. 
Low: the lowest price since the initial position has been taken. 
AF: an acceleration factor. 
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placed on the top of web pages. The tabs are actually links to other pages to 




The detailed implementation is as follows: 
Time Track: 
The trading beginning date and ending date are placed on the upper left 
and right side of each page. The two dates are implemented using input boxes so 




There is a “Simulation” icon on the top of each web page. There are 
three processes available in the simulation system namely “screen stocks”, “buy 






Process 1: Screen stocks - determine which stocks to buy 
a) Select the cut-off probability of acquisition. 
This can be implemented using an input box, but defaults to the value of 
cut-off probability of acquisition. 
b) Construct a trade table with the potential securities. 
 The table includes information about ZSCORE, reporting date, and the 
probability of acquisition for each security. This can be implemented using a 
“Trade Table” button. When a user clicks on “Trade Table” button, a trade table 
window is displayed, which provides a list of potential selected securities 
information. 
 
Process 2: Buy stocks – triggered by the buy signal. 
a) Search for a buy signal using a moving average for all chosen stocks. 
In the “trade table” window, there is a  “buy signal” button. When a user  
clicks on the “buy signal” button, It will display the date on which stocks are 
bought. 
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b)     Enter the trading conditions. 
The following conditions can be implemented using input boxes. 
• Limited percentage of the traded shares purchased (initial 
percentage is 20%). 
• Maximum volume of any stock (initial volume is 1000). 
• Limited percentage of stock weight in the budget. 
• Budget constraint. 
a) Process an order. 
By clicking on the “submit order” button, a user commits to a buy 
process. 
b) Display current position. 
Clicking on the “current position” button displays an investor’s  
account activity which represents what they have in their portfolio as well as 
any recent trades. 
 
Process 3: Sell stocks – is triggered when exit signals appear. 
Clicking on the “sell stock signal” button will bring up a window with  
a list of trading exit rules. Select any trading exit rule, then click on the “test” 
button. If it displays the sell signal, then clicking on the “sell stock” button to 
complete selling stock process. 
 
Announcements: 
“Announcements” is an icon placed on the top of each web page.  
When a user clicks it, a window displays all the stocks in the user’s stock 
portfolio file. Clicking any stock will display the stock’s delisting information 
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“Reports” is an icon placed on the top of each web page. To review a  
list of all past executed trades, click on this button. In this report, an abnormal 
return is computed for each security during the trading period. The time of stock 
entry and exit is listed in the report as well. The total portfolio return is 
displayed at the bottom of the report. 
 
Optimization: 
“Optimization” is an icon placed on the top of each web page. A user 
can edit the formula for any exiting technical trading rules. When a user clicks 
“Optimization”, trading system templates will be displayed in a dropdown list. 
The user can select any trading exit rule, then click on a “formula” button to 




Conclusions and Future Work 
 
8.1  Conclusions 
Takeovers as a means of restructuring financially distressed firms have 
significant effects in the industry. There are three motivations for takeovers 
summarized as follows: the managerial discipline motive, the complementary 
resources motive and the cash-free-cash-flow motive. These takeovers eliminate 
inefficient management, make better use of existing resources, add revenues and 
create growth opportunities. A notable influence of acquisitions on the share 
prices of targets is that share price increases significantly during the time when 
the acquisition announcement is publicized. 
The acquisition prediction model developed by Åstebro and Winter 
(2000) was tested for its ability to predict actual acquisition during the period 
from 1979 to 1998 and across all industries. There was a trend of acquisition 
events rising as the value of the probability of acquisition increases. However, 
the model wasn’t that successful in predicting outcomes. One reason is that the 
use of data sample is extended both in time and across industries. The 
acquisition model was based on eight years of financial data from 1980 to 1989 
from 16 randomly selected three-digit industries, with a total of 3013 firms 
covered by COMPUSTAT. In the process of validating model, twenty years of 
data, from 1979 to 1998, was applied. Therefore, the limited size of the original 
data sample used in creating the acquisition model may be a reason for the lack 
in accuracy of the acquisition prediction for the twenty year data sample. The 
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second reason is that the COMPUSTAT financial data may not be very timely 
and in general are not very predictive (Chava and Jarrow 2000).The third reason 
is that the age dummy variable is no longer used in calculating the probability of 
acquisition because the actual stock entry year is found in the CRSP daily stock 
files.10  
This research applies several statistical methodologies in the analysis. 
These methodologies form the basis to substantiate the result of the analysis. 
I examined the hazard rate of acquisition and bankruptcy for financially 
distressed firms. The results of the analysis indicate that ZSCORE and 
SPCSRM can be used as financial distress indicators in the screening 
mechanisms. I also analysed the cut-off values for ZSCORE and extracting 
years. There two cut-off values forms the rules for data extraction An abnormal 
return estimation model is used to maximize a stock’s excess return over a given 
period of time for a given ZSCORE, probability of acquisition and the length of 
holding period. 
A simulation technique is applied to derive the best cut-off probability 
of acquisition and construct the hypothesis test. There are three results from the 
simulation analysis: 1) Null hypothesis for the mean of daily excess return g is 
randomly rejected, which implies g may be significantly or insignificantly 
different from 0. 2) The prediction model of acquisition lacks accuracy. There 
seems to be no clear relationship between excess portfolio return and the 
                                                 
10 Input variables used in creating the acquisition model only comes from the 
COMPUSTAT files, where the earliest year of available information is 1979. Thus for 
any stock entering the market before 1979, the entry year must be set to 1979. This 
inaccuracy of recording the stock entry year is mathematically complemented by the 
variable “age dummy” in the creation of the model. 
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probability of acquisition. 3) Increasing ZSCORE has little impact on the 
portfolio return. 
Another contribution of this research is the development of a 
sophisticated computer systems used for data extraction, analysis and modelling. 
The Perl programming language is used across multiple computer platforms for 
data collection. For example, accounting data is retrieved from the 
COMPUSTAT files in the Windows platform, and market data is extracted from 
the CRSP files in the UNIX environment. These two sources of data are 
integrated through a linking file which is provided by Dr.Norli from the Rotman 
School of Management. An Oracle database is created to install the accounting 
data and market data. An Entity Relationship Diagram (abbreviated as “ERD”) 
is set up, representing the relationship of the tables. The Java programming 
language is used to compute Matrix functions, which derives the value of the 
excess return. These accomplishments allow abnormal return model to be put to 
practical use for computing returns using stock price data. The simulation model 
is coded in the Java programming language as well, which means the cut-off 
probability can be calculated and updated very easily. 
 
8.2  Future Work 
Although there have been some interesting and potentially useful results 
obtained from the research done here, there are many aspects to be considered in 
terms of developing an actual buy-sell system: 
1) The decision rules used to define the corporate events are based on the 
CRSP delisting files instead of the deletion reason code from the 
COMUPSTAT files. Research finds that the distribution code in the CRSP 
distribution files has detailed information for the announcement on each 
 102
distribution declaration date. In future development, it is recommended that 
the distribution code should be combined with the delisting code to clearly 
identify three financial outcomes: acquisition, failure and survival. 
2) In the above conclusions, it is pointed out that the expanded data sample and 
updated age dummy variable may be the reasons for the decrease in the 
degree of accuracy of the acquisition prediction model. If the model of 
acquisition is recalculated based on a larger data sample, the coefficients of 
all variables in the model can be updated to improve the efficiency of the 
model. This modified acquisition model may be able to provide a more 
accurate prediction of acquisition events in the buy-sell system. 
3) From statistics on abnormal return for corporate events, the average holding 
period return computed using the OLS estimation model is a function of the 
length of holding period. A stock with the short holding period has the large 
value of holding period return. I would suggest investigating the function 
relationship between the excess return and the holding period in the future 
work. 
4) In the buy-sell system, the stock entry rules apply the fundamental analysis 
using ZSCORE and cut-off probability. In the real trading system, technical 
analysis is also very important in determining the stock entry rules. Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of managerial performance can be considered as one of the 
stock entry rules. 
5) What is the cost of the financial distress? It is suggested here that an 
econometric model be built to estimate this cost. Qualitative as well as 
quantitative measures of the costs of financial distress could be researched 
in future development. If it is determined that financial distress is too costly, 
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then another valuable research topic would be to investigate the value of 








200 Issue acquired in merger, payment details unknown. 
201 Merged into or in order to form an issue trading on NYSE. 
202 Merged into or in order to form an issue trading on AMEX. 
203 Merged into or in order to form an issue trading on Nasdaq. 
205 When merged, shareholders primarily receive shares of mutual funds. 
231 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADRs. 
Replaces codes 201, 202 and 203. Codes 201-203 are no longer assigned. 
232 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADRs. 
(Merged stock is not maintained on the CRSP file.) Replaces codes 210-220. 
Codes 210-220 are no longer assigned. 
233 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock. Merged stock 
is not mailtained on the CRSP file. 
234 When merged, shareholders primarily receive preferred stock or warrants or 
rights or debentures or notes. 
235 When merged, shareholders primarily receive other property. 
240* Flags merger with missing final distribution information. 
241 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock and cash, 
issue on CRSP file. 
242 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock and preferred 
stock or warrants or rights or debentures or notes, issue on CRSP file. 
243 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock, issue on 
CRSP file and other property, issue on CRSP file. 
244 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADR, and 
cash and preferred stock or warrants or rights or debentures or notes. Issue on 
CRSP file. 
251 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADRs and 
cash. (Merged stock is not maintained on the CRSP file.) 
252 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADRs and 
preferred stock, or warrants, or rights, or debentures, or notes. 
253 When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock or ADRs and 
other property. 
261 When merged, shareholders primarily receive cash and preferred stock, or 
warrants, or rights, or debentures, or notes. 
262 When merged, shareholders primarily receive cash and other property. 
271 When merged, shareholders primarily receive preferred stock or warrants, 
or rights, or debentures, or notes and other property. 
280 Issue delisted due to merger attempt, but merger attempt failed. 
290 Flags a merger with missing final distribution information. Replaces code 







300 Issue acquired by exchange of stock, details unknown. 
301 Issue exchanged for issue trading on NYSE. 
302 Issue exchanged for issue trading on AMEX. 
303 Issue exchanged for issue trading on Nasdaq. 
320 Issue exchanged for stock trading Over-the-Counter. 
331 Issue exchanged, primarily for another class of common stock. Replaces 
codes 301, 302, and 
303. Codes 301-303 are no longer assigned. 
332 Issue exchanged, primarily for another class of common stock. (Other stock 
is not maintained on the CRSP file.) 
333 Issue exchanged, primarily for cash. 
334 Issue exchanged, primarily for preferred stock, or rights, or warrants, or 
debentures, or notes. 
335 Issue exchanged, primarily for other property. 
340* Flags an exchange with missing final distribution information. 
341 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and cash. Issue on 
CRSP file. 
342 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and preferred stock 
or warrants or rights or debentures or notes. Issue on CRSP file. 
343 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and other property. 
Issue on CRSP file. 
350* Flags an exchange attempt that was not sufficient to "kill" issue. 
351 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and cash. Issue not 
on CRSP file. 
352 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and preferred stock, 
or warrants, or rights, or debentures, or notes. Issue not on CRSP file. 
353 Flags an exchange, shareholders receive common stock and other property. 
Issue not on CRSP file. 





400 Issue stopped trading as result of company liquidation. 
401 Issue liquidated, for issue trading on NYSE. 
403 Issue liquidated for issue trading on Nasdaq. 
450 Issue liquidated, final distribution verified, issue closed to further research. 
460 Issue liquidated, no final distribution is verified, issue closed to further 
research. 
470 Issue liquidated, no final distribution is verified, issue pending further 
research. 
480 Issue liquidated, no distribution information is available, issue is pending 
further research. 









500 Issue stopped trading on exchange - reason unavailable. 
501 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to NYSE. 
502 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to AMEX. 
503 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Nasdaq. 
505 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Mutual Funds. 
510 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Boston Exchange. 
513 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Midwest Exchange. 
514 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Montreal Exchange. 
516 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Pacific Stock Exchange. 
517 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 
519 Issue stopped trading current exchange - to Toronto Stock Exchange. 
520 Issue stopped trading current exchange - trading Over-the-Counter. 
535 Delisted by current exchange - unlisted trading privileges. 
550 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of market makers. 
551 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of shareholders. 
552 Delisted by current exchange - price fell below acceptable level. 
560 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity. 
561 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient (or non-compliance with rules 
of) float or assets. 
570 Delisted by current exchange - company request (no reason given). 
572 Delisted by current exchange - company request, liquidation. 
573 Delisted by current exchange - company request, deregistration (gone 
private). 
574 Delisted by current exchange - bankruptcy, declared insolvent. 
575 Delisted by current exchange - company request, offer rescinded, issue 
withdrawn by underwriter. 
580 Delisted by current exchange - delinquent in filing, non-payment of fees. 
581 Delisted by current exchange - failure to register under 12G of Securities 
Exchange Act. 
582 Delisted by current exchange - failure to meet exception or equity 
requirements. 
583 Delisted by current exchange - denied temporary exception requirement. 
584 Delisted by current exchange - does not meet exchange’s financial 
guidelines for continued listing. 
585 Delisted by current exchange - protection of investors and the public 
interest. 
586 Delisted by current exchange - composition of unit is not acceptable. 
587 Delisted by current exchange - corporate governance violation. 
588 Conversion of a closed-end investment company to an open-end investment 
company. 
589 Delisted by current exchange - unlisted trading privileges 
590 Delisted by current exchange - underlying assets have merged with another 
company 




Creating Use Cases 
 
Use case name: Screen stocks                                       ID number:1 
 
Short description: This describes how to select stocks to compose the  
                              portfolio. 
 
Trigger: Investors want to invest stocks. 
 




Description                              Source 
Major Outputs: 
 
Description      Destination 

















size of the portfolio 
(constraints for the number 
of stocks in a stock 
portfolio) 
investor probability of 





Major Steps Performed 
 
1. Use ZSCORE as a first screening mechanism to select the financially 
distressed firms. 
2. Compute the probability of acquisition for each selected firm. 
3. Add up the total number of firms for each γ . 
4. Simulate γ  to get the lowest value of γ  so that the number of matched 
firms (n) is less than or equal to the required size of the portfolio (N); or 












Use case name: Buy stocks                        ID number:2 
 
Short description: This describes the volume of each matched stock an  
                              investor can buy to compose their stock portfolio. 
 
Trigger: The matched stocks are selected. 
 




Description                       Source 
Major Outputs: 
 
Description                 Destination 
Select starting trading 
date 
investor  
Trading volume V  







Marketing data (such as 








Investor’s budget (B) 
(Constraints of buying 
ability for an investor) 
investor   
Read limited 
percentage of total 
trading volume for each 
purchased security 
(10% is initially set) 
investor   
Read maximum volume 
of stocks purchased 
(1,000 is initially set) 
investor Budget Stock portfolio 
file 
Read the limited weight 
of each purchased 
security in its budget 
(10% is initially set) 
investor Purchasing 
volume V it  for 
each matched 





Major Steps Performed 
 
1. Select starting trading date. 
2. Use a firm’s permno to get trading volume, ask price and bid price 
of each matched stock from table tb_stockDailyPrice. 
3. Calculate the volume of each stock purchased in the portfolio, so 
that V  satisfies the following equations: it
      V  <= Limited Percentage (10%)  * it V itc  
      V <= Maximum volume for any security (1,000) it
       * V  = limitedWeight (10%) * B p it it













































Use case name: Sell stocks                                                       ID number: 3 
 
Short description: This applies trade exit rules to decide whether to sell  
                              stocks or stay in stock market on day t. 
 
Trigger: when any one of the applied trading exit rules is met, sell the stoc 






Description                            Source 
Major Outputs: 
 
Description        Destination
Financial trade stops. 
Apply either profit 











Time stop  Target date or 
announcement 
date is met 
  
Probability of bankruptcy 
indicator on day t 
Table: tb_cplus   













Major Steps Performed 
1. A trader selects any combination of trade exit rules. 
2. Compute the formula for the selected trade exit rules. 
3. Make a decision whether to stay or exit the stock market according to 
each different trade rule. 
4. If stock i exits the market, compute the return for this stock using OLS 
estimation model. 




















Use case name: Compute portfolio return      ID number:4
 
Short description: calculate the return for each existing stock, then  
                             compute the portfolio return. 
 
Trigger: Trading ending date is met 




Description                      Source 
Major Outputs: 
 
Description       Destination 













Major Steps Performed 
1. Compute abnormal return for all existing stocks using OLS 
estimation model. 
2. Calculate two types of the portfolio return: average daily portfolio 
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Probability of acquisition Matchedstocks
selected
Read Limited percentage of stock purchased,
Maximum volume of stock purchased,












Stock return (loss or profit)
deleted stock info.









Data Validation and Methods Limitation  
 
1. Observations 
In the collected data, there are four significant observations: 
Observation 1: the percentage of the firms with excess stock returns that 
range between –0.4 and 0.4 (abbreviated as “valid firms”) reaches 99% of the 
total number of screened firms. 
Observation 2: when both probability of acquisition and ZSCORE are 
simulated from 0.5 to 1.0, the valid firms with excess stock returns reach the 
maximum of 100% when the value of probability of acquisition is greater than 
or equal to 0.8 for any simulating ZSCORE value except when ZSCORE is 
equal to 1. 
Observation 3: all firms with excess returns outside the range of -0.4 to 
0.4 have the stock holding days equal to or less than 10 days. In other words, 
when a stock is held longer than 10 days, the excess return is observed in the 
valid range between –0.4 and 0.4. 
Observation 4: in the output analysis, the maximum excess return is 
1.05614513, and the minimum excess return is -0.86666668. The firms 
corresponding to the above extremes of excess returns have the stock held for 
only one day. 
 
2. Data Validation Analysis 
When a stock price jumps up or down by 40% on the next day, it is 
considered as the extreme event case. It implies that a firm either goes into 
bankruptcy or is being acquired soon. The investor decision for this event is to 
 115
sell the stock. In the output analysis, it is observed that if a stock is held for only 
one day, the excess return is comparably higher; however, if the time that the 
stock stays in a portfolio becomes longer, its excess return gets flat and smaller. 
This observation is consistent with the mathematical fact that when a value is 
averaged by a large number, its quotient gets smaller. Therefore, the 1% of the 
so-called extreme number of excess returns in the output data sample can be 
explained by the above buying decision business rule. 
 
3. Data Measurement Error Analysis 
When the probability of acquisition takes a value of 0.5 and the 
ZSCORE takes a value of 0.5, the following relatively large values of excess 
returns are observed as listed in table 24: 
 
Permno  track_begdt enddt distressbegdt excess_return 
holding
_days dlstcd
11562 7/31/1987 12/31/1989 12/29/1989 -0.76162174 1 561 
45082 4/16/1984 7/2/1985 2/28/1985 -0.65438008 1 550 
50630 1/1/1980 12/31/1984 12/31/1981 0.48512334 3 580 
51335 8/9/1983 12/31/1989 12/29/1989 -0.46617167 1 574 
56980 1/1/1980 9/24/1980 4/30/1980 -0.86666668 1 500 
63264 8/15/1980 10/12/1988 9/30/1988 0.66643798 1 550 
73921 7/15/1983 12/31/1989 12/29/1989 0.91008658 1 450 
78036 4/25/1983 12/31/1989 12/29/1989 -0.4782581 1 550 
81454 8/4/1981 12/31/1989 12/29/1989 1.05614513 1 550 
91062 10/8/1984 10/23/1985 3/29/1985 -0.57251078 0 560 
92161 11/5/1984 6/30/1989 6/30/1986 0.60113149 7 233 
 





The output analysis concluded that the records derived with an excess 
return greater than 0.4 and less than -0.4 are due to measurement error. The first 
measurement error is that the observation event period is subjectively defined as 
the constant in this simulation experiment. The value of the event period 
arbitrarily chooses 10 years which starts from Jan 1, 1980 and ends on Dec 31, 
1989. In the above table, there are five out of eleven firms whose stock selling 
dates are on Dec. 31, 1989. Their bias excess returns are associated with the 
error that relates to the event ending date. The firms that are found to be related 
to another error constrained to the beginning of the event period Jan 1, 1980 are 
firms with permno 50630 and 56980. For those two firms, the research finds that 
in the CRSP stock daily price file, the firm with permno 50630 first enters the 
stock market on May 26, 1970, and the firm with permno 56980 starts on Dec 
14, 1972. However, these two firms are tracked starting on Jan 1, 1980 instead 
of their real first trading date. 
The other measurement error is related to the value of the distress years 
selected. In this simulation, the number of distress years that a firm is allowed to 
survive is chosen as three years. In the above table, there are two firms with 
permno 50630 and 92161 that are forced to exit the market 3 years after the 
onset of financial distress. However, the firm with permno 50630 exits the stock 
market 7 years after the onset of financial distress, and the firm with permno 
92161 exits the stock market 13 years after the onset of financial distress. 
Combining these two measurement errors, there are eight out of eleven 
firms which have bias values. The measurement error is calculated to be around 
73% for the number of firms with invalid excess returns. As a comparison, these 




PERMNO BEGDT ENDDT 
11562 7/31/1987 6/25/1998 
50630 5/26/1970 5/26/1988 
51335 8/9/1983 6/26/1990 
56980 12/14/1972 9/24/1980 
73921 7/15/1983 2/14/1992 
78036 4/25/1983 11/13/1990 
81454 8/4/1981 10/16/1990 
92161 11/5/1984 8/3/1999 
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